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For decades, energy policy has struggled to reconcile two distinct visions 
for the future: the first seeks ever-more-competitive, efficient, and dynamic 
electricity markets, while the second seeks an ever-greener mix of electricity 
generation sources. Caught within this push-and-pull dynamic is the regulatory 
contract—a nineteenth-century concept that stands more for ordered regulation 
than competitive markets. This Article examines how piecemeal pursuit of two 
energy visions has produced mismatches between rapidly evolving markets and 
governance institutions that cannot change as quickly. To better evaluate these 
mismatches, the Article develops a framework that accounts not just for market 
operation and environmental externalities, but also the technical constraints of 
grid operation and electricity fuels. Relying on the experience of nuclear power, 
the Article creates an account of how a fuel source can be priced out of the 
market despite its apparent advantages in reliability and air emissions. With 
this understanding, the Article evaluates the political economy and governance 
challenges associated with diverse policy options aimed at better capturing 
valuable attributes of electricity. Ultimately, this analysis furthers our 
understanding of the regulatory contract in the marketplace, suggesting an 
updated vision for its role in mediating the competing goals for electricity 
markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory contract is undergoing a profound reformation.1 
Once a cornerstone of progress dating at least to the Industrial 
Revolution, the model—under which an entity “clothed with the public 
interest” assumes basic duties and submits to price regulation in 
exchange for a monopoly franchise—has been used to build everything 
 
 1.  Broadly speaking, the term “regulatory contract” refers to the body of legal rules defining 
the relationship between regulated industries, such as public utilities, and the state. The term is 
referenced in Jersey Century Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(Starr, J., concurring); see also Alfred E. Kahn, Who Should Pay for Power Plant Duds?, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 15, 1985, at 26 (“The essential basis of public-utility regulation is an implicit bargain 
between consumers and investors that, in exchange for a monopoly franchise, the company accepts 
. . . strict legal obligations . . . .”). The term is applied broadly for such relationships in regulated 
industries, but our focus here is on electric utilities.  
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from bridges to power lines.2 In recent years, however, competitive 
markets have become the norm for many formerly regulated industries, 
leaving vestiges of regulatory regimes that fit awkwardly with 
competition.3 This is nowhere more apparent than in energy policy, 
particularly as it struggles to reconcile two distinct visions for the 
future of electricity: the first seeks ever-more-efficient and dynamic 
markets; the second seeks ever-greener, low-impact electricity. 
Pursuit of both visions has effected significant change in how 
electricity is valued—and at the intersection of this push-and-pull 
dynamic is the regulatory contract. In many states, the model of state-
regulated utilities providing monopoly electricity service to customers 
has been replaced by merchant generators operating on dynamic 
wholesale markets.4 In those markets, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”) operates not so much as a rate-setting agency, 
but as the overseer of regionally operated markets and private 
wholesale bargaining.5 In states that have embraced retail competition, 
state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) fill a similar role. In 
traditionally regulated states, PUCs continue to set rates, but struggle 
to efficiently interface between their retail interests and those of the 
wholesale market.6 Thus, the regulatory contract is no longer a 
straightforward arrangement between states and traditional utilities. 
 
 2.  Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876) (upholding price regulation of grain elevators 
because they were “affected with a public interest”); see also Proprietors of the Charles River 
Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420, 557 (1837) (McLean, J., concurring) 
(referencing contractual relationship between the government and bridge proprietors); Jersey 
Cent., 810 F.2d at 1189 (providing a description of electric utility regulation). 
 3.  The debate between those who favor markets and those who favor regulations undergirds 
many of the issues we address here. One can find tensions between the two throughout the 
scholarly literature, spanning decades. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: 
Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 550 (1979) (“Too 
many arguments made in favor of government regulation assume that regulation, at least in 
principle, is a perfect solution to any perceived problem with the unregulated marketplace.”);  Ryan 
Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1593, 1597–99 (2015) (illustrating that prevailing preference in behavioral law and economics for 
market-based approaches to market failures artificially excludes traditional regulatory tools like 
direct mandates); Robert E. Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks of Financial Product 
Deregulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 21 (1985) (arguing deregulated financial institutions could 
behave in ways that increase risk); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. 
L. REV.  1349, 1362–63 (2011) (describing how behavioral economics bears on the market versus 
regulation debate).  
 4.  See infra Part I (developing the evolution of electricity markets and explaining of rise 
merchant generators). 
 5.  See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824(o)(b)(1) (2012) (giving FERC 
authority to regulate bulk power system reliability); 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 385 (2015) [hereinafter Order 
888] (requiring open access for transmission); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 
1006, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding FERC’s permitting market-based rates). 
 6.  See infra Section III.B (describing relevant litigation). 
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Rather, multiple regulatory entities and suppliers now actively 
influence how electricity is bought and sold. 
Along with the move toward competitive markets, efforts to 
encourage cleaner electricity have also had a significant impact on the 
electricity sector. Indeed, some of these efforts have been intertwined 
with the move toward competitive markets. The energy crises of the 
1970s, for example, produced the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978 (“PURPA”),7 a statute aimed at both incentivizing cleaner 
electricity and ensuring its access to the grid.8 State renewable portfolio 
standards (“RPSs”) and Integrated Resource Planning (“IRP”) also 
emerged from this era, further pushing alternative electricity resources 
that could compete in the market against traditional sectors, 
particularly for fossil-fueled electricity. The Clean Air Act (“CAA”),9 for 
example, now regulates more pollutants from more plants, and more 
stringently, than ever before.10 The Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(“EPA”) recent actions to limit greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from 
fossil-fueled generators are just the latest steps in that process.11 
What are the impacts of these changes? Some argue that 
competitive pressures will bring about a utility “death spiral;”12 
 
 7.  Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (Nov. 9, 1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
45).  
 8.  See infra Section I.B (discussing these developments). 
 9.  Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q). 
 10.  See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) 
(adding provisions for toxics and acid rain); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500–01 (2007) 
(holding greenhouse gases to be within CAA definition of “air pollutant”); JAMES E. MCCARTHY & 
CLAUDIA COPELAND, EPA’S REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN-WRECK” COMING? 7–
28 (2011), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41914.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TKW-P3SX] (discussing 
regulations for coal-fired power). 
 11.  See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CARBON POLLUTION EMISSION 
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/ 
cpp-final-rule.pdf [http://perma.cc/5LJZ-ZFLD] [hereinafter CLEAN POWER PLAN] (establishing 
emission guidelines to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired electric 
generating units); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (proposing a new source performance standard for carbon-dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel-fired electric utility generating units).  
 12.  Liam Denning, Lights Flicker for Utilities, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2013), 
http://on.wsj.com/1zELmhT [http://perma.cc/6GJ4-B7GF] (using the term “death spiral” to 
describe impacts of market changes on traditional utilities); see also EDISON ELEC. INST., 
DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES:  FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO A CHANGING 
RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 3 (2013), http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/ 
disruptivechallenges.pdf [http://perma.cc/3XGC-A6GR] (“[A]n old-line industry with 30-year cost 
recovery of investment is vulnerable to cost-recovery threats from disruptive forces.”). But see 
William Pentland, Why the Utility “Death Spiral” is Dead Wrong, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2014/04/06/why-the-utility-death-spiral-is-dead-
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environmental regulation will produce a “train wreck”13 of inadequate 
generating capacity, and both forces will set grid reliability back 
decades.14 Others welcome disruptive technologies and business 
models,15 arguing that a green, market-based system is impossible 
without a complete overhaul of traditional utility law.16 The stakes are 
high: electricity disruptions cost billions of dollars;17 poorly designed 
markets are vulnerable to manipulation;18 more than half a million 
people die each year from the health impacts of coal-fired emissions;19 
and the need to mitigate and adapt to climate change is only growing 
 
wrong/ [http://perma.cc/T82N-35EG] (arguing utilities’ good credit ratings belie the death spiral 
argument). 
 13.  See MCCARTHY & COPELAND, supra note 10, at 1–3 (summarizing the train wreck 
argument). 
 14.  See, e.g., STEVEN FINE ET AL., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON 
THE U.S. GENERATION FLEET: FINAL REPORT 10–14 (2011), http://www.pacificorp.com/content/ 
dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2011IRP/EEIModelingReportFina
l-28January2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/F4ZZ-AQ7A] (summarizing potential impacts for unit 
retirements, capacity additions, pollution control installations, and capital expenditures). But see 
SUSAN F. TIERNEY & CHARLES CICCHETTI, THE RESULTS IN CONTEXT: A PEER REVIEW OF EEL’S 
“POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON THE U.S. GENERATION FLEET” 1–4 
(2011), http://ccicchetti.com/uploads/Tierney_and_Cicchetti_-_EEI_Peer_Review_-_Summary_-
_May_2011-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/9LQQ-DUDB] (criticizing Fine et al., supra, for being based on 
worst-case assumptions). 
 15.  See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to 
Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1712, 1716–18 (2014) (arguing for regulatory 
changes to enable disruptive grid technologies); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption 
and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2013) (criticizing preemptive federal law for 
stifling innovation).  
 16.  Our analysis herein assumes the continuing importance of at least some central-station, 
grid-supplied power, at least for the next few decades. 
 17.  U.S.-CANADA POWER SYS. OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 
BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 1 (2004), https://reports.energy.gov/ BlackoutFinal-
Web.pdf [http://perma.cc/P8DC-UWWE].  
 18.  For discussions of the manipulation of wholesale electricity markets in California, see 
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted?: The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron 
on Energy Markets, 4 HOUSTON BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 41–46 (2004); and David B. Spence & Robert 
Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market Power, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 131, 154–64 (2012). 
 19.   Jennifer Duggan, China’s Coal Emissions Responsible for “Quarter of a Million 
Premature Deaths,” THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2013/dec/12/china-coal-emissions-smog-deaths [http://perma.cc/A3WS-CC6X]; M. Rajshekhar, 
Premature Deaths Due to Emissions from Thermal Plants to Rise Two-Three Times in India, ECON. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-12-09/news/ 
56879425_1_dioxide-india-urban-emissions [http://perma.cc/D3G4-ZJD3].   
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more urgent.20 The governance challenges and implications alone are 
staggering, and, at this point, anything but clear.21 
Policymakers, courts, and scholars have made important 
contributions to understanding each of these issues.22 What is missing 
from the discussion, however, is an integrative framework—an 
analytical approach that permits disciplined consideration of how all of 
the concerns raised above work together. In this Article, we develop a 
tripartite framework, one that integrates: (a) the economic 
considerations that dominate market competition and impact the 
attractiveness of various fuel sources for investors;23 (b) the technical 
constraints within which the grid, and its associated generation 
technologies, operate;24 and (c) the negative environmental 
externalities associated with each fuel for electricity.25  Implicit in our 
approach is the view that the market-based and environmental 
imperatives need not trump one another, notwithstanding the tensions 
 
 20.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 
SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 2–4 (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ 
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8Q6-J3XE] (synthesizing 
comprehensive set of reports). 
 21.  See, e.g., ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1595–98 (2015) (considering 
preemptive sweep of Natural Gas Act’s provisions that are read in pari materia with similar 
Federal Power Act provisions); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3d Cir. 2014), 
pet’ns for cert. filed sub noms. CPV Power Dev., Inc. v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 2014 WL 6737445 
(U.S. Nov. 26, 2014) (No. 14-634) and Fiordaliso v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 2014 WL 6998396 (U.S. 
Dec. 10, 2014) (No. 14-694) (holding New Jersey’s effort to compensate a new generation for 
capacity market disparities was preempted by Federal Power Act); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. 
Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Hughes v. PPL EnergyPlus LLC, 
2015 WL 6112868 (Oct. 19, 2015) (holding a Maryland Public Service Commission order preempted 
under field and conflict preemption); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 224–25 
(D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (May 4, 2015) (holding Order 745 invalid as beyond 
FERC’s jurisdiction and concluding that the pricing rationale was arbitrary and capricious). 
 22.  See generally William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
1614, 1682–1708 (2014) (exploring the awkward fit between markets and the traditional concept 
of public utility, particularly as related to climate change issues); Jody Freeman & David B. 
Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 58–62 (2014) (surveying FERC’s 
attempts to adapt Federal Power Act to clean energy goals); Jim Rossi, The Electricity Deregulation 
Fiasco:  Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provision 
of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768, 1778–81 (2002) (exploring problem of providing public 
goods in markets); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 765, 806–08 (2008) (describing the problem of capacity assurance in competitive markets); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Past, Present, and Future of Energy Regulation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 
291, 296–307 (2011) (arguing that climate change mitigation is of utmost importance and 
providing an overview of pros and cons of various fuel-related changes); Amy Stein, Distributed 
Reliability (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 23.  We use the shorthand “cost” to refer to this part of the framework. See infra Section I.C.1. 
 24.  We use the shorthand “reliability/flexibility” to refer to this part of the framework. See 
infra Section I.C.2.  
 25.  We use the shorthand “environmental externalities” to refer to this part of the 
framework. See infra Section I.C.3. 
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between them. Moreover, any vision of the energy future ought to seek 
to maximize reliability and flexibility. Obtaining low-cost, low-impact, 
and reliable/flexible electricity is a tall order, but we believe that a self-
conscious analysis of exactly what the trade-offs are is a prerequisite to 
reaching that goal. 
This article examines the ways in which the move toward 
competition and markets is changing the balance in that tripartite 
framework of cost, reliability/flexibility, and environmental impacts. 
We illustrate these changes using the example of nuclear power.  
Nuclear power, once heralded as the clean energy of the future,26 has 
been priced out of the market despite its apparent advantages: the 
absence of carbon or other emissions, its inexpensive fuel, its reliability, 
and its admirable safety record in the United States. Using our 
framework, we show how policies generated by the struggle between 
the environment imperative and the market imperative, as mediated 
by politics and risk perceptions, have led to this counterintuitive 
outcome. This analysis helps identify various policy options that can 
better reconcile the parameters of cost, environmental impact, and 
reliability.27 Bringing our analysis full circle, we then construct a 
typology of policy options. Some of the options we present are prompted 
by our analysis in this Article; others are drawn from current 
experimentation and proposals developed in the existing literature. The 
examples reveal increasing heterogeneity at the subnational level. By 
paying careful attention to how these options fit within our tripartite 
framework, we can identify the mechanisms by which they would either 
alter the markets or alter the value of what is traded on the markets. 
This exercise provides insights into the practicability of each option. It 
also reveals future research needs—most critically, the need to consider 
how various proposals would complement or hinder one another if 
implemented simultaneously.28 
Ultimately, this analysis also furthers our understanding of the 
regulatory contract in the marketplace.29 The move to a green, 
competitive electricity market has not eliminated the regulatory 
 
 26.  See infra Section II.B (describing early optimism). 
 27.  As described in more detail infra Part I, we use “reliability” as shorthand for a host of 
features that impact reliability, including being available when called on and having the ability to 
respond quickly.  
 28.  The need is particularly strong as states grapple with the implications and uncertainties 
of EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan. See infra Section III.B (describing states’ reluctance to adopt 
policy options in light of uncertainty regarding the Clean Power Plan). 
 29.  This analysis may also be relevant to other traditionally regulated industries that 
interface with markets, such as communications. See Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality 
and Quality of Service:  What a Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like , 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16–
27  (2015) (providing a framework for considering future net neutrality rules). 
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contract; it has only changed that contract. The law continues to charge 
regulators with many of the same duties under competition as it did 
under price regulation. And holders of private capital continue to rely 
on those legal institutions in deciding whether to invest in the provision 
of electric services. But where investors were once guaranteed a fair 
return by regulatory fiat under the old system, they now must earn a 
return in a competitive electricity market. We show how these changes 
create new roles for all parties to the contract. 
Part I of this Article begins with an overview of the shift from 
traditional rate regulation to competitive markets for electricity.30 To 
ensure an appreciation for the technical aspects of electricity, this part 
provides an overview of how the electric grid is operated.31 Next, Part I 
lays out our analytical framework, providing details on how three 
criteria—cost, reliability/flexibility, and externalities—are valued (or 
not) in electricity markets.32 The final section of Part I considers the 
theory and practice of markets, drawing heavily from the economics 
literature to further contextualize our framework. 
In Part II we turn to the example of nuclear power to 
demonstrate how a combination of regulatory pressures, risk perception 
mechanisms, and market flaws has prevented competitive markets 
from fully valuing nuclear power’s desirable attributes. This includes 
an analysis of the “nuclear risk premium,”33 identifying where it comes 
from, why it exists, and how it is that this low-emission, reliable 
technology is disadvantaged in competitive markets. 
In Part III we explore the broader lessons to be gleaned from the 
nuclear example, first by delving into the political economy of modern 
electricity markets and the governance challenges posed by the 
changing regulatory contract. Next, we examine a series of policy 
options that address the market’s failure to optimize cost, 
reliability/flexibility, and environmental value.34 In so doing, we 
consider various objections and legal hurdles to the options and 
conclude with some observations about the general implications of our 
analysis for regulators and regulated industries. In Part IV’s 
conclusion, we express the hope that our framework furthers the search 
for a principled analysis for the energy policy decisions that matter 
most today and that will arise in the future. 
 
 30.  See infra Section I.A. 
 31.  See infra Section I.B. 
 32.  See infra Section I.C. 
 33.  See infra Part II. 
 34.  See infra Section III.A. 
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I. ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND THE GRID 
The last three decades have seen dramatic change in the 
relationship between energy regulators and prospective investors in 
electricity generating plants. That change has played out in an iterative 
back-and-forth between market participants and policymakers.35 It has 
yielded a new regulatory environment that relies increasingly on 
market forces to provide the capital investment that sustains the 
electric system and entails considerably more risk for prospective 
investors than their twentieth-century counterparts ever faced. In 
order to understand why that is, it is necessary to understand how 
electricity markets work, how the electric grid works, and the roles of 
different types of generation sources in the electric system—both 
historically and today.  This Part takes up that task. 
A. The Evolution of Modern Markets 
 Built on the back of a regulatory contract, the American electric 
grid developed to serve the relatively localized needs of investor-owned 
utilities (“IOUs”).36 IOUs generated most of the power they sold to their 
customers, and owned and operated the infrastructure over which they 
delivered that power. Although IOUs dominated the industry, other 
kinds of electric service providers—primarily municipal utilities and 
rural cooperatives—grew up in areas left unserved by IOUs.37 
Regardless of the type of provider, however, each was a monopoly 
providing service in its own geographic service area.  Each service area 
included a set of distribution lines, served by higher-voltage 
transmission lines, and the grid soon grew into an enormous, 
interconnected set of systems of mostly alternating-current 
transmission and distribution lines.38 These interconnected systems 
 
 35.  See STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED STATES:  MARKETS AND 
POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 460 (2015) (describing this iteration as 
“muddling through”). 
 36.  An IOU is a privately owned, vertically integrated company providing electric service to 
retail customers. For summaries, see generally JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT:  EDISON, TESLA, 
WESTINGHOUSE, AND THE RACE TO ELECTRIFY THE WORLD (2004) and JOHN F. WASIK, THE 
MERCHANT OF POWER: SAM INSULL, THOMAS EDISON, AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN 
METROPOLIS (2008). 
 37.  For description of other electricity providers, see infra notes 47–51 and accompanying 
text. 
 38.  Generally, we use the term “transmission” to refer to the movement of electric current 
over longer distances at higher voltages (so-called bulk power transfers), and “distribution” to refer 
to the delivery of electricity at lower voltages from high-voltage transmission lines to end users. 
“Voltage” is a measure of the electric potential between two points and is the basis for rating 
transmission or distribution lines. Transmission lines typically move power at voltages exceeding 
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eventually came to comprise three grids in the continental United 
States: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and 
the Texas Interconnection.39 Within each of these three systems, 
electric current flows in the direction provided by the path of least 
resistance.  In this way, virtually every generator of electricity is 
connected (however indirectly) with virtually every consumer of 
electricity.40 
The amount of electricity being dispatched to the grid by 
generators at any given point in time must equal the amount being 
taken off the grid by consumers.41 If loads are not balanced, the system 
will fail, causing blackouts and other problems. To keep loads in 
balance, the operators of the grid must marshal information about 
historic usage patterns, weather forecasts, generators’ operational 
plans, and the like to estimate levels of supply and demand in the near- 
and longer-term future.42 Using this information, operators have 
generation resources ready to dispatch power or demand-side resources 
ready to curtail usage, when needed.43 
For most of the history of the American electric system, these 
balancing services were performed almost exclusively by IOUs, which 
provided monopoly service to their customers. IOUs generated most of 
the power they sold and supplied it over lines they owned.44 Rate 
 
110 kilovolts (“kV”); some transmission lines, however, move power at voltages in excess of 1,000 
kV. Distribution lines move power at less than 110 kV, typically between 4 and 34.5 kV. For a 
primer on these topics, see generally JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC 
POWER SYSTEMS (2d ed. 2010). 
 39. The Texas interconnection is separated from the remainder of the American grid 
primarily to avoid federal jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). See David B. Spence 
& Darren Bush, Why Does ERCOT Have Only One Regulator?, in ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: 
THE TEXAS STORY 9, 9 (L. Kiesling & A. Kleit eds., 2009). 
 40.  The current is thus capable of flowing across state lines, and it is this interconnectedness 
that subjects most electricity transmission to federal regulation under the FPA. See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824(b) (2012) (claiming federal jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 454–55, 469 (1972) 
(finding Federal Power Commission (“FPC”) jurisdiction on this basis).  
 41.  The North American power grid is maintained at a frequency of sixty Hertz (“Hz”).  If 
the grid strays too far from this frequency, the system fails. CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 38, at 
47–48. 
 42.  See Matt Davison et al., Development of a Hybrid Model for Electrical Power Spot Prices, 
17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 257, 260 (2002) (“It is known that power demand is tightly 
linked to weather and follows predictable seasonal and diurnal patterns.”). 
 43.  See P. Jazayeri et al., A Survey of Load Control Programs for Price and System Stability, 
20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 1504, 1504 (2005) (describing demand-side resources). Our 
technical description is considerably oversimplified. For more detail, see STEVE ISSER, supra note 
35, at 121–34. 
 44.  A sizeable minority of customers receive their electric service from government entities—
municipal utilities or other governmental agencies, like the Tennessee Valley Authority—or rural 
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regulation protected consumers against monopoly pricing, and ensured 
that utilities would earn a reasonable rate of return on most of their 
investments in generation.45 On those rare occasions when utilities 
found it necessary to buy wholesale power from a neighboring utility 
during times of shortage, they coordinated these transactions 
informally, knowing that the cost of the transaction would be recovered 
through rates.46 FERC exercised ratemaking jurisdiction over 
wholesale power sales, and state PUCs regulated retail rates.47 
For these reasons, merchant generators—those selling primarily 
into wholesale markets—were virtually unheard of prior to the late 
1970s. The generation mix came to be dominated by utility-owned 
plants using conventional fuels—first coal, hydroelectric, and oil 
facilities, and later natural gas and nuclear facilities.  Those same 
utilities controlled access to the transmission grid. The seeds of change, 
however, were sown earlier, with the passage of PURPA in 1978.48 
PURPA sought to diminish the barriers that IOUs posed to new 
entrants by requiring utilities to purchase power from so-called 
“qualifying facilities” (“QFs”)—small power producers that used 
renewable fuels as well as cogeneration producers.49 PURPA thus 
incentivized renewable generation, which led to the construction of 
hundreds of merchant wind, solar, biomass, small hydro, and gas-fired 
cogeneration facilities across the United States. These nonutility 
generators, in turn, created pressure for nondiscriminatory access to 
the electric grid so that they could sell their electricity directly to 
retailers or industrial customers.50 In 1996, FERC promulgated Orders 
 
electric cooperatives. See JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 71–
72 (4th ed. 2015) (surveying various types of service providers). 
 45.  Id. at 464–500 (describing the basic principles of rate regulation); see infra text 
accompanying notes 235–45 (providing more detail on the applicable tests). For a discussion of 
these concepts, see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307–16 (1989); Jersey Central 
Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 810 F.2d 1168, 1175–78 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 46.  This informal coordination was managed through “power pools,” voluntary associations 
of IOUs and municipal utilities established to facilitate coordination along utility boundary lines. 
CASAZZA & DELEA, supra note 38, at 56. 
 47.  This wholesale/retail distinction still applies for purposes of jurisdictional authority. See 
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). But note that its apparent bright line is deceptive. See, e.g., sources cited 
supra note 21. 
 48.  16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–45 (2012). 
 49.  A “cogeneration facility” is a facility that produces both electric energy and steam or some 
other form of useful energy (such as heat). 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A) (2012). A “small power 
production” facility is a facility that has a production capacity of not more than eighty megawatts 
and produces electric power from biomass, waste, renewable resources such as wind, water, or 
solar energy, or geothermal resources. 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A) (2012).   
 50.  The Energy Policy Act of 1992 also created a new regulatory category of utility—Exempt 
Wholesale Generators (“EWGs”)—which were in the business of selling electricity exclusively at 
wholesale and were exempt from the Public Utility Holding Companies Act (“PUHCA”), but were 
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888 and 889, which mandated: (a) unbundling electricity transmission 
from wholesale electricity sales and (b) that owners of transmission 
lines act as common carriers providing transmission service on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to affiliated and non-affiliated companies 
alike.51  By separating wholesale sales from transmission services in 
this way and opening the transmission grid to third party (non-utility) 
buyers and sellers of electricity, FERC laid the groundwork for 
competition in wholesale electricity sales.  Indeed, at the same time 
FERC began to authorize most wholesale sellers of electricity to charge 
market-based rates.52 
Around the same time, some states began to introduce 
competition and market-based rates into their retail markets. States 
like California, Texas, and New York led the way.53 As part of the 
process of opening retail markets to competition, incumbent utilities in 
these competitive retail markets sold most of their generation assets or 
spun them off into subsidiaries, further increasing the profile of 
independent merchant generators, marketers, and brokers within the 
industry.54 Competition brought an increase in the number and volume 
of arms-length transactions on wholesale electricity markets and a 
geographic broadening of those markets, all of which strained the 
capacity of the transmission grid.55 In response, FERC pushed owners 
 
subject to FERC jurisdiction. See Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act 
of 1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 
464–68 (1993). The statute also authorized FERC to order transmission access under some 
circumstances. See id. at 459–64 (describing provisions). 
 51.  Order 888, supra note 5; Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-
Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order No. 889, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (May 
10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37 (2015)) [hereinafter Order 889]; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824j-1 
(2012) (providing for open access to transmission lines under some circumstances); New York v. 
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 535 U.S. 1, 28 (2002) (upholding Order 888). Under Order 888, 
transmission providers are required to file open access transmission tariffs (“OATTs”), which must 
meet various criteria. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 (2015) (describing requirements).   
 52.  See ISSER, supra note 35, at 148 (describing FERC’s market-based pricing policy 
following Orders 888 and 889); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1006, 1011–13 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding FERC’s use of market-based rates).  
 53.  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER 
INDUSTRY 2000: AN UPDATE 74–77 (2000), http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/ 
index.cgi/4265704/FID1578/pdf/electric/056200.pdf [http://perma.cc/P9PT-CJ9A]  (providing an 
overview of restructuring). 
 54.  See ISSER, supra note 35, at 166 (noting the opportunity to sell power from the divested 
generation during this time period); id. at 181–84 (providing examples from Texas and California). 
 55.  The U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) tracks wholesale power 
transactions at individual trading hubs. At the NEPOOL hub (located in New England), there 
were about 1,500 trades completed in 2001, involving approximately 1.37 million megawatt-hours 
(“MWh”) of electricity; in 2013, there were more than 6,700 trades involving 5.76 million MWh. 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY AND NATURAL GAS MARKET DATA (2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/wholesale/#history [http://perma.cc/P437-27WZ]. 
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of transmission lines to form “independent system operators” (“ISOs”) 
and “regional transmission organizations” (“RTOs”) to help manage the 
provision of transmission services and oversee wholesale power 
markets.56 
Today, these ISOs/RTOs manage the day-to-day operation of 
wholesale power markets, schedule ancillary services (reserves 
necessary to balance load), and ensure there is sufficient long-term 
generating capacity to meet projected demand.57 They can ensure 
adequate reserves in either or both of two ways. One way is by relying 
on the price signal to incentivize new investment, as is done in the 
ERCOT system in Texas.58 A second approach is to create and manage 
separate capacity markets, in which owners of electricity generating 
facilities are paid to have capacity available in the event that it is 
needed in the future.59 For example, in the PJM,60 New England, and 
New York systems, the relevant ISOs run capacity markets like these. 
Today, there are seven major ISOs or RTOs in the United States, 
managing a significant portion of the power grid.61 In parts of the grid 
 
 56.  See Order 888, supra note 5, at § 35.28 (establishing requirements for ISOs); Regional 
Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 809, 841–911 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 
18 C.F.R. pt. 35.34(j)–(k) (2015)) (similar for RTOs). For purposes of this analysis, there is no 
meaningful distinction between ISOs and RTOs.  
 57.  The term “reserves” refers to generating capacity that is currently unused but that is 
available to serve load. If that capacity is already running, so that the operator may dispatch its 
electricity to the grid on very short notice, it qualifies as “spinning reserves.” “Regulation” services 
are the grid management activities that maintain frequency and voltages at their proper level, to 
ensure grid reliability. Willett Kempton & Jasna Tomić, Vehicle-to-Grid Power Fundamentals: 
Calculating Capacity and Net Revenue, 144 J. POWER SOURCES 268, 271 (2005).  
 58.  THE BRATTLE GROUP, ESTIMATING THE ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL RESERVE MARGIN IN 
ERCOT 1 (2014); see also William W. Hogan, On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market Design for 
Resource Adequacy, JFK SCH. OF GOV’T, HARV. UNIV. 34 (Sept. 23, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) 
(noting energy-only markets change, but do not eliminate, regulatory interventions); infra Section 
III.B.3 (describing ERCOT’s approach to capacity). 
 59.  See Forward Capacity Market, ISO NEW ENGLAND, http://www.iso-ne.com/markets-
operations/markets/forward-capacity-market (last visited Sept. 16, 2015) [http://perma.cc/BKC8-
5F8Q] (explaining capacity markets). 
 60.  “PJM” began in 1927 as a power pool of three utilities. ISSER, supra note 35, at 210. It 
was loosely named for the three states that comprised most of its original territory: Pennsylvania, 
New Jersey, and Maryland. The ISO has grown well beyond those three states, but retains the 
name PJM. Id. at 123; see also Territory Served, PJM (last visited Aug. 14, 2015),  
http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/territory-served.aspx [http://perma.cc/MV93-7H2N]. 
 61.  The seven are: the New England ISO (ISONE), covering the New England states; the 
New York ISO (NYISO); the PJM Interconnection (PJM), stretching from the Chicago area to the 
mid-Atlantic states; the Midcontinent ISO (MISO), stretching from Minnesota south to the south-
central part of the country (excluding Texas); the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), covering portions 
of the plains states; the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT); and the California ISO 
(CAISO). Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), 
FERC (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp 
[http://perma.cc/R6CC-YMVY].  
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not so managed—mainly the southeast and the mountain west—the old 
system of IOU-centric markets, power pools, and traditional rate 
regulation prevails. 
B. The Operation of Competitive Wholesale Markets 
In competitive wholesale power markets, prices are determined 
by the forces of supply and demand rather than regulatory fiat. Prices 
are established in two settings: (a) longer-term bilateral power 
purchase agreements (“PPAs”) and (b) real-time or day-ahead spot 
markets.62 In the PPA setting, a generator or other wholesale seller 
bargains with a retailer or other buyer to reach a contractual 
agreement. Spot markets, by contrast, are multilateral, and the price is 
established through an auction—a bidding process that establishes a 
market-clearing price for individual time increments during the day.63 
Wholesale prices must satisfy the Federal Power Act’s (“FPA”) 
requirement that rates be just and reasonable,64 and FERC has 
determined that both PPA prices and spot market prices can satisfy this 
standard.65 
RTOs and ISOs not only oversee wholesale power markets; they 
also oversee the technical operation of the grid within their boundaries.  
The actual work of keeping the grid up and running is done by control 
area operators.66 Despite the widespread use of PPAs, these grid 
operators do not take PPAs into account in their dispatch decisions. 
Rather, when the grid operator dispatches power from individual 
electric generating facilities to the grid, it does so on a least-cost basis. 
That is, from any status quo level of demand, as the next increment of 
power is needed to satisfy additional demand, the grid operator 
dispatches power from the available generating facility that is willing 
to provide the power at the lowest cost. Generally, grid operators 
 
 62.  Most electricity retailers secure power using both PPAs and the spot market; in some 
wholesale markets all power deliveries are priced through the spot market, and PPAs serve only 
as a price hedging mechanism. See Bob Mango & John A.C. Woodley, The Inevitable 
Commoditization of Electric Power Markets, 132 FORTNIGHTLY 27, 31 (1994) (describing use of 
contracts as hedges for spot markets). 
 63.  For a discussion of the operation of modern spot markets, see EISEN ET AL., supra note 
44, at 625–726. 
 64.  Federal Power Act (FPA) § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012). 
 65.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353–54 (1956) (applying 
the principle to power sales contracts under the FPA); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas 
Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956) (applying the principle to natural gas contracts under the 
Natural Gas Act); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. F.E.R.C., 383 F.3d 1006, 1011–13 (9th Cir. 
2004) (upholding FERC’s use of market-based rates). 
 66.  ISSER, supra note 35, at 123 (“A control area is a geographic region with a control center 
responsible for operating the power system within that area.”). 
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deviate from this priority rule only to ensure the security of the power 
system—to avoid severe congestion or other operational problems that 
could be associated with dispatching the least-cost unit. Thus, the grid 
operates on a “security-constrained, least-cost dispatch” or “security 
constrained economic dispatch” (“SCED”) rule.67 This rule protects 
ratepayers from paying unnecessarily high (unjust and unreasonable) 
rates and applies in both traditionally regulated systems and 
competitive wholesale markets.68 
Ideally, competitive wholesale spot markets work in sync with 
the SCED principle. For each time increment during the day, sellers 
and buyers submit their bids indicating how much they are willing to 
accept and pay, respectively, for power. The RTO or ISO matches 
buyers’ and sellers’ bids and determines the market-clearing price, 
which all sellers will receive and all buyers will pay, for power 
dispatched to the system during that time increment. Sellers should bid 
into the market at a price that reflects their short-run marginal cost of 
supplying power (that is, the cost of providing one additional unit of 
power).69 A large number of factors can influence the marginal cost of 
dispatching a particular plant at a particular time. For example, a 
thermal plant operating at less than full capacity will have a lower 
marginal cost of providing the next unit of power than it would if it had 
to provide the additional power from a cold start. Sometimes, the plant 
with the lowest marginal cost is located in the wrong place, such that 
dispatching power from that plant will cause transmission congestion 
that threatens the security of the system. Taking these and other 
factors into consideration, the operator may perform this market-
clearing function for multiple locations (nodes) within the system, and 
may adjust prices to reflect congestion—so-called “nodal” pricing, or 
locational marginal pricing (“LMP”).70 
In theory, dispatch decisions could incorporate more than just 
the generator’s costs. For example, social or external costs, such as 
estimated costs of pollution emitted by the generator, could be 
 
 67.  For a basic description of SCED, see FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, SECURITY 
CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC DISPATCH:  DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 
(2006), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/joint-boards/final-cong-rpt.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/J785-DLMR]. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  See William W. Hogan, Competitive Electricity Market Design:  A Wholesale Primer, JFK 
SCH. OF GOV’T, HARV. UNIV. 5 (Dec. 17, 1998), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/ 
empr1298.pdf [http://perma.cc/D8UG-YTNL] (describing relationship of short-run marginal costs 
to bidding). 
 70.  See TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., ALTERNATING CURRENTS:  ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 90–91 (2002) (explaining LMP). 
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considered as well.71 In practice, however, no grid operator does so. 
Instead, the SCED principle means that public policies favoring 
renewable power influence dispatch decisions only indirectly, by 
impacting the price at which sellers will be willing to sell (and buyers 
to buy) power into the system at various time increments the following 
day. The production tax credit for renewable generators depresses the 
willingness-to-accept bids of qualified renewable generators, for 
example, by paying them approximately two cents per kilowatt-hour 
(“kwh”) of power dispatched to the grid.72 State renewable portfolio 
standards can have a similar effect on willingness-to-accept bids 
because sellers earn revenue from the sale of renewable energy 
certificates (“RECs”) for each kwh dispatched to the grid.73 
From this description it should be evident that competitive 
wholesale electricity markets entail much more price risk for parties on 
both sides of the market than traditionally regulated electricity sales. 
The PPA is one way to hedge that price risk. Least-cost dispatch rules 
may prevent the seller from delivering power to the buyer, but the sale 
obligation (at the contract price) remains, requiring a financial 
settlement between buyer and seller. Wholesale electricity market 
participants can also use energy derivatives to hedge risk.74 
In sum, energy markets have undergone fairly profound changes 
over the last few decades, and the regulatory contract has changed 
along with them. Fifty years ago informal associations of IOUs kept the 
grid operating cooperatively, knowing that rate regulation insulated 
them from price risk. Now, in much of the country, those informal 
arrangements have been replaced by arms-length market transactions 
that subject the market participants to price risks. What is the role of 
the regulatory contract in this setting? Even where cost-of-service 
ratemaking remains the norm, the line between FERC’s and PUCs’ 
jurisdiction has shifted.75 The Supremacy Clause dictates that states 
must permit state retailers to pass wholesale costs through to 
customers, and generators that sell into the wholesale markets must 
 
 71.  Indeed, economists and engineers have proposed algorithms for these kinds of 
“environmental/economic dispatch,” or “social cost dispatch,” systems. See infra Section III.C.  
 72.  For most of the last three decades Congress has enacted tax credits for renewable power 
sources. The production tax credit has hovered around 2 cents per KWh. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 45 
(2012) (1.5 cents/KWh).   
 73. See EPA, RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/ 
gpmarket/rec.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2015) [http://perma.cc/PD2H-VFWQ] (describing renewable 
energy certificates). 
 74.  See Spence & Prentice, supra note 18, at 150–54 (describing growth of energy derivatives 
markets). 
 75.  The line is anything but clear. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21 (providing overview 
of litigation). 
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take the market price.76 Thus we increasingly rely on spot markets to 
provide the best signals to investors about the optimal mix of fuel 
sources, storage, and demand-side resources, raising the question of 
whether markets can meet that challenge.77 
C. Electric Generation: Serving Markets and the Grid 
In competitive wholesale electricity markets, generators and 
other wholesale sellers seek to maximize revenue from the sale of 
power. By contrast, grid operators seek to keep the grid and wholesale 
power markets running smoothly and efficiently. In this Section, we 
evaluate the attractiveness of different electricity generation sources 
from the grid operator’s point of view, using the tripartite framework 
we set forth in the Introduction: (1) cost; (2) reliability/flexibility; and 
(3) environmental externalities. Obtaining reliable electric service that 
is as inexpensive as possible requires a mix of different kinds of 
electricity generation—some that can operate efficiently at high 
outputs in order to supply base load78 and others that can react 
efficiently to sudden changes in demand by ramping up and down 
quickly and at a reasonable cost. Moreover, fuel diversity also protects 
the public against the cost effects of sudden or sharp increases in the 
price of a particular fuel. Toward this end, state utility laws typically 
articulate the goal of a diverse generation mix.79 The environmental and 
 
 76.  Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371–72 (1988); see 
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986) (“[I]nterstate power rates 
filed with FERC or fixed by FERC must be given binding effect by state utility commissions 
determining intrastate rates.”). The latter point, as it relates to capacity markets, is the subject of 
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’ns for cert. filed sub noms. CPV 
Power Dev., Inc. v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 2014 WL 6737445 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2014) (No. 14-634) and 
Fiordaliso v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 2014 WL 6998396 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2014) (No. 14-694); and PPL 
EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Hughes v. PPL 
EnergyPlus LLC, 2015 WL 6112868 (Oct. 19, 2015). 
 77.  See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005) (identifying flaws that undermine these 
goals).  
 78.  The term “base load” refers to the portion of demand that is relatively constant and in 
need of service most of the time. By contrast, “peak load” refers to higher levels of demand that 
exist (and must be served) for only relatively short periods of time. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
GLOSSARY, at http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm [http://perma.cc/8K7U-NKE4] 
(providing definition of base load, peak load, and many other energy terms). 
 79.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 1007 (2015) (directing Delaware state regulators to 
ensure that utilities consider fuel diversity in acquiring new capacity); FLA. STAT. § 366.05 (2015) 
(authorizing Florida commission to require installation of particular generation sources upon 
finding insufficient fuel diversity in state’s generation mix); id. § 403.519 (directing Florida Public 
Utilities Commission to consider need for fuel diversity and supply reliability when determining 
need for new power plant); N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 164 (McKinney 2015) (making fuel diversity one 
of the evaluative criteria in New York’s electric generation siting approval process). 
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social costs of electricity generation are not a direct component of grid 
dispatch and are not directly valued on the wholesale market.  
However, they are of concern to EPA and the states from a regulatory 
standpoint, which puts pressure on the electricity market structure. 
This in turn raises a number of important questions about the 
boundaries of regulators’ jurisdiction (both horizontal and vertical), a 
point to which we return in Part III. 
There are tradeoffs to be made among minimizing out-of-pocket 
cost to ratepayers, having a generation mix that is both reliable and 
flexible, and minimizing environmental externalities. Each of the major 
electricity generation source types—coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydro, 
wind, and solar80—bring different strengths and weaknesses to the task 
of serving these three goals. 
1. Cost 
In competitive markets, IOUs and investors jealously guard 
their cost data,81 but many entities publish estimates of the relative 
costs associated with different electricity fuels. We begin with the 
“levelized cost of energy” (“LCOE”). The LCOE represents the real-
dollar cost per kilowatt-hour of building and operating an electricity 
generation plant over the financial and operating life of the plant. Thus, 
it includes capital costs, fuel costs, fixed and variable operating and 
maintenance (“O&M”) costs, and financing costs.82 Investors care about 
LCOE because it represents an estimate of the average amount of 
money the plant owner must earn over the plant’s life in order to break 
 
 80.  We focus on these six sources because the first four comprise the majority of electric 
generation today (92% in 2013), and because the last two, along with natural gas, comprise the 
majority of projected future growth in generation (more than 95%). See What is U.S. Electricity 
Generation By Source, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/ faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 
[http://perma.cc/7P28-NKYE] (last visited Mar. 4, 2015); Natural Gas Solar and Wind Lead Power 
Plant Capacity Additions in First Half of 2014, EIA.GOV (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17891 [http://perma.cc/R2C7-U37B]. Our 
consideration of solar power focuses on central station solar serving the grid, not distributed 
rooftop solar. Note that this list does not include non-generation resources such as energy storage, 
demand response, or efficiency; these resources supply energy or load reductions to the grid, 
respectively, but in much smaller amounts. Nevertheless, the framework we develop in this Article 
can be applied to these other resources as well. See Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: 
FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets , 4 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 93–96 (2013) (analyzing jurisdictional issues associated with 
demand response); infra Section III.A.1 (discussing FERC’s approach to demand response).   
 81.  Thus, we are unable to present figures for bid prices in the wholesale markets. 
 82.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW 
GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 1 (June 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf [hereinafter EIA LCOE 
ESTIMATES] [http://perma.cc/8J6M-47KY]. 
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consistent with the relative lack of planned new construction for coal 
and nuclear generation, and the growth of natural gas-fired and 
renewable generation.90 
Second, a closer look at the components of LCOE provides a 
sense of the relative capital costs of newly constructed plants. On a per-
megawatt-hour (“MWh”) basis, the capital costs of nuclear, wind, solar 
PV, and coal are quite high compared to CCNG. EIA estimates the 
levelized capital cost at $70.1/MWh for a new nuclear facility (74% of 
LCOE), $109.8/MWh (88% of LCOE) for solar PV, $57.7/MWh (78% of 
LCOE) for wind, and $60.4/MWh for coal (64% of LCOE).91 By 
comparison, the corresponding capital cost estimate for CCNG is only 
$14.4/MWh (19% of LCOE).92 Note that for nuclear, high capital costs 
reflect longer construction periods (and hence, higher financing costs), 
more specialized components, and the need for highly skilled labor, 
among other things.93 
Finally, note that the LCOE data reported in Figure 1 reflect 
assumptions about “capacity factors,” that is, the percentage of time the 
plants will be dispatching into the grid over their projected lifetimes. 
Because investors must pay the capital costs of new plants upfront, they 
must try to predict capacity factors over the forty-plus year life of the 
plant. If these facilities have higher capacity factors than assumed in 
the analysis, their capital costs per MWh will be lower; if the facilities 
have lower capacity factors, capital costs per MWh will be higher.94 
Even in traditionally regulated markets controlled by vertically-
integrated IOUs, capacity factors may be difficult to predict over the life 
of a plant, given reliance on SCED and the possibility of drastic changes 
in relative fuel prices, costs imposed by new regulations, and the rise of 
disruptive new technologies. However, in traditionally regulated 
markets, investors who overestimate their facility’s capacity factors 
often expect that they will nevertheless recover their capital costs and 
 
 90.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 MT-17, EIA.GOV (Apr. 
2014), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/AEO/pdf/0383%282014%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/L4ER-WSN3] 
(“Natural gas-fired plants account for 73% of capacity additions from 2013 to 2040 in the Reference 
case, compared with 24% for renewables, 3% for nuclear, and 1% for coal.”). 
 91.  EIA LCOE ESTIMATES, supra note 82, at 6. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See Lucas W. Davis, Prospects for Nuclear Power, 26 J. ECON. PERSPS. 49, 53–54 (2012) 
(“Nuclear power plants are characterized by high construction costs and relatively low operating 
costs.”).   
 94.  Many nuclear power plants have obtained amendments to their licenses permitting 
uprates, meaning they can now run at higher capacities than initially permitted; others have 
canceled their uprate requests in light of lower capacity needs. EIA ASSUMPTIONS, supra note 86, 
at 101.   
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a fair rate of return.95 This is not so in competitive wholesale markets, 
where the SCED rule will ultimately determine plant revenues. 
Further, the capacity factors for intermittent renewables like wind, 
solar, and some hydro are not directly comparable to the others because 
their generating time is not driven by grid operators, but rather by 
natural conditions.96 
Another factor important to investors, and included in LCOE, is 
the cost of fuel. Fuel costs are a key component of fossil-fueled plant’s 
variable O&M costs and are thus an important component of those 
plants’ short-run marginal costs (which will form the basis of market 
bid prices).97 Natural gas prices are projected to remain relatively low, 
due in large part to the shale gas revolution, but they represent a 
relatively large share of the cost of a gas-fired plant. Wind and solar 
generation have no fuel costs, so their variable O&M costs approach 
zero. Nuclear also has competitively low fuel costs (lower than coal).98 
Thus, EIA estimates the variable O&M costs of natural gas the highest 
($58-94/MWh), followed by coal ($29/MWh), nuclear ($12/MWh), hydro 
($7/MWh), and both wind and solar ($0/MWh).99 Taking all of the data 
discussed above into consideration (not only variable O&M), it stands 
to reason that in competitive energy markets, the cost criterion will 
point investors toward new gas-fired, wind, and solar power, and away 
from coal-fired and nuclear power. 
Remember that these cost data reflect estimates for new 
generating facilities, averaged over the useful life of the facilities. But 
the U.S. generation fleet includes existing generating plants that have 
been operating for decades and may have recovered all or a significant 
portion of their capital costs through regulated rates.100 To the extent 
 
 95.  There are numerous provisos, some of which are considered infra Section II.C.   
 96.  EIA LCOE ESTIMATES, supra note 82, at 3. Even comparing generators’ capital costs on 
the basis of nameplate capacity (that is, dollars per unit of energy the generators can produce), the 
upfront investment in a nuclear plant is six or seven times that of a CCNG facility, and four times 
that of a solar PV or wind farm. See LAZARD’S LCOE ESTIMATES, supra note 84, at 11 (depicting 
forecasted LCOE over time for certain forms of solar power); see also BLACK & VEATCH, supra note 
84, 9–48 (comparing the costs and performance projections for these different forms of energy 
production). 
 97.  The marginal operating cost will also include fixed O&M, like service on debt, and, in the 
case of nuclear, payments for insurance, decommissioning, and waste management. See infra 
Section II.B. 
 98.  EIA LCOE ESTIMATES, supra note 82, at 6.  
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Many of the coal-fired plants projected to retire in response to new EPA regulation of 
mercury and greenhouse gas emissions, for example, fit this description. Retrofitting these plants 
with new pollution control equipment will render them noncompetitive in wholesale power 
markets. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see David E. Adelman & David B. Spence, Cost-
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that these plants can operate after their capital costs have been paid, 
they can offer power to the grid at prices that are below their levelized 
costs. For example, consider again nuclear power’s low fuel costs 
compared to coal; the nuclear fuel costs also differ from coal in that they 
do not vary with plant output over the short run.101 Thus, the short-run 
marginal costs for nuclear power ought to be nearly zero.102 There are a 
variety of reasons, however, that the logic of marginal cost bidding (and 
of the SCED rule) in competitive spot markets does not ensure that 
plant owners will earn a positive return on investment. First, 
sometimes plants with competitive bids are not dispatched due to 
technical grid issues. Second, even if a plant is dispatched, the plant 
will not earn a positive return on investment unless the average 
market-clearing price over time exceeds the plant’s long-run average 
costs.103 Further, public policies and market forces have depressed 
short-run marginal costs in the industry. The shale gas revolution has 
depressed natural gas prices, and hence, marginal cost-based bids from 
natural gas-fired generators. As described in the next section, natural 
gas is a peaking fuel, so its costs tend to drive the clearing price. 
Increasing penetration of zero-marginal-cost renewables, along with 
renewables subsidies, also depresses bids from those sources such that 
spot prices in some markets are sometimes negative.104 An additional 
competitor, providers of demand-response (“DR”) services, ought to 
further depress market prices over the long run as well.105 Overall, 
these forces increase the percentage of time when market-clearing 
prices fall below some plants’ long-run average costs. 
2. Reliability/Flexibility 
As noted in the Introduction, we use the term 
reliability/flexibility to capture the ability of the various generating 
 
Benefit Politics in U.S. Energy Policy 30–35 (Aug. 11, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642459 [http://perma.cc/JN5E-DUFY]. 
 101.  The Economics of Nuclear Power, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Economic-Aspects/Economics-of-Nuclear-Power/ [http://perma.cc/6MV5-E9V5] 
(last updated Sept. 2015). 
 102.  Nuclear Power & Short-Run Marginal Cost, NUCLEAR ECON. CONSULTING GRP. (Oct. 1, 
2014), http://nuclear-economics.com/nuclear-power-short-run-marginal-cost/ [http://perma.cc/ 
2VQY-75FL]. As described in detail in Part II, however, nuclear power plants built in the 1970s 
and 1980s struggle to remain competitive.    
 103.  Long-run average costs reflect the total of a plant’s marginal costs averaged over its 
lifetime. Id.   
 104.  See id. 
 105.  See generally Eisen, supra note 80, at 70–85 (explaining the role of DR in energy markets 
and debate over how DR should be compensated in those markets). 
        
164 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1:141 
fuels to meet the technical needs of the grid.106 In considering this 
criterion, it is important to understand that grid reliability is promoted 
by a diversity of fuels because diversity makes the overall system 
flexible. Some generation sources can respond quickly to changing 
system needs, while others excel at providing the constant power 
needed to serve base load. A diverse mix ensures efficient use of these 
attributes. Generally, existing coal-fired and nuclear plants were 
designed to run at full capacity for extended periods to serve base load, 
and they do not cycle (turn on and off) or ramp up and down as 
efficiently as gas-fired or hydroelectric plants.107 For example, by 
forcing a coal-fired power plant to cycle more frequently (or ramp more 
quickly) than its design specifications suggest, the operator imposes 
excess wear and tear on the plant, and emits more pollution per MWh 
of power produced than it would by remaining within design 
specifications.108 Natural gas combustion turbines, by contrast, were 
designed for load following: they can cycle and ramp much more 
efficiently and quickly than coal-fired or nuclear plants.109 
Because of their intermittency, neither wind nor solar facilities 
can provide the load-following services offered by fossil-fueled plants. 
To the contrary, their intermittency increases the load-following burden 
on grid operators by adding another source of short-term variation in 
addition to variations in demand.110 Wind and solar facilities vary the 
amount of power they supply to the grid, but because their marginal 
costs are so low, their power tends to be dispatched to the grid whenever 
they are operating. When they are not operating—the wind stops 
 
 106.  Our focus here is on generation fuels; the full spectrum of ancillary services is beyond 
the scope of this Article. See ISSER, supra note 35, at 127 (describing ancillary services, which 
include frequency regulation, spinning reserves, and nonspinning reserves). Non-generation 
resources can also provide reliability value, and are discussed further infra Section III.C. 
 107.  See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, MANAGING LARGE-SCALE PENETRATION OF INTERMITTENT 
RENEWABLES 26–27 (Apr. 20, 2011), http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/intermittent-renewables-
full.pdf [http://perma.cc/N5G7-UEK9] (describing cycling and ramping). The only hydroelectric 
plants that can follow load are those operated in storage mode. Many such plants, however, operate 
in run-of-the-river mode, meaning that the amount of water passing through the turbines is equal 
to the amount of flow entering the reservoir from upstream; this is done to keep the reservoir at a 
constant level. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 44, at 345–93 (setting forth legal regime for 
hydropower).  
 108.  J. Nicolas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in Integrating 
Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, ELEC.  J., Aug.–Sept. 2010, at 33, 37 (2010). 
 109.  New CCNG turbines can also ramp relatively quickly compared to other sources. See 
generally BLACK & VEATCH, supra note 84, at 9–48 (listing ramp rates and “quick start” rates for 
various generation technologies); MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 107, at 11, 27 (providing 
various ramping rates and noting that ramping a nuclear plant quickly requires more operator 
involvement, increasing the risk of operator error).   
 110.  See MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, supra note 107, at 18–21 (describing system impacts of 
intermittent generation). 
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blowing or the sun stops shining for example—grid operators must call 
on other resources to balance loads.111 
Because reliability/flexibility is dependent on a mix of 
generation characteristics, it is also sensitive to the availability and cost 
of fuel. Like coal, uranium is relatively inexpensive and worldwide 
reserves are considered substantial.112 Moreover, both coal-fired and 
nuclear power plants have storage capacity: coal can be stockpiled 
onsite, and nuclear fuel assemblies last about eighteen months to two 
years. This capacity hedges the risk of supply interruptions, further 
enhancing these sources’ reliability for electricity generation. The 
history of natural gas-fired power is different. Historically, natural gas 
prices were relatively high and volatile, reflecting both periodic 
insecurity about domestic supply and the relative lack of storage 
capacity on the interstate pipeline system.113 The shale gas revolution, 
however, now holds the prospect of price stability and ample domestic 
supply for the future.114 But natural gas-fired power plants are still 
dependent on the interstate and local pipeline systems through which 
they acquire their fuel; fuel is typically not stored on site, and many 
gas-fired plants rely on interruptible gas service for their fuel supply.115 
 
 111.  For this reason, many have argued that natural gas pairs well with intermittent 
renewables because of its load-following capabilities. See, e.g., Puga, supra note 108, at 37. 
Demand-side resources also have a role to play in this regard. Eisen, supra note 80, at 79–80. 
 112.   Davis, supra note 93, at 58–59. Also like coal, uranium is available domestically. 
However, currently only about 17% of uranium delivered in the United States is of U.S. origin. 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2013 URANIUM MARKETING ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2014), 
http://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/pdf/2013umar.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PR5-CPVF]. More 
than half the enrichment, however, takes place in the United States. Id. at 2. The Nuclear Energy 
Institute reports that efforts are underway to revitalize the U.S. uranium production industry. 
Nuclear Fuel Supply: Abundant Supplies of Uranium, NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, 
http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/Nuclear-Fuel-Supply (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/4M29-38XQ]. 
 113.  In the 1970s the country faced a severe natural gas shortage, triggering forms of 
rationing. Subsequent price deregulation triggered production increases. See Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 1995, at 
53, 53–54, 84. However, by the end of the twentieth century analysts were anticipating the need 
to import LNG to serve domestic demand, and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included provisions 
intended to incentivize terminal construction. 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012). 
 114.  See Don Mason, Report Predicts 20 Years of Stable Natural Gas Prices, FUEL FIX (Jan. 
16, 2014), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2014/01/16/report-predicts-20-years-of-stable-natural-gas-prices/ 
[http://perma.cc/3VBD-K52U] (crediting shale gas revolution for projections of price stability).  
 115.  See Communication of Operational Information Between Natural Gas Pipelines and 
Electric Transmission Operators, 78 Fed. Reg. 70,164, 70,165 (Nov. 22, 2013) (codified at 38 C.F.R. 
pt. 38 (2015)) (permitting natural gas and electric transmission operators to share non-public 
information to facilitate reliability and integrity for interconnected systems). See also Coordination 
of the Scheduling Processes of Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines and Public Utilities, 151 FERC 
¶ 61,049 (Apr. 16, 2015) (addressing disparate scheduling issues for natural gas and electricity 
sectors); FED. ENERGY REG. COMMM’N, WINTER 2013–2014 OPERATIONS AND MARKET 
PERFORMANCE IN RTOS AND ISOS 8 (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2014/04-
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Of course, for wind, solar, and hydro plants, their “fuels” are 
produced locally and essentially free of charge. Rather, the primary 
threat to reliability for these technologies is weather-induced 
intermittency—the possibility that the sun won’t shine, the wind won’t 
blow, or river flows will be too low. For that reason, EIA classifies these 
three technologies as “non-dispatchable,” meaning that they cannot be 
counted on to deliver power when needed the way fossil-fueled and 
nuclear plants can.116 Moreover, we can make a distinction between the 
predictability of power from these sources and its variability.  Wind 
power, in particular, can be variable in ways that affect generation 
output. Forecasters may be able to predict that the blades of the wind 
turbine will be turning one hour from now; however, it may be difficult 
to predict exactly how fast they will be turning (and therefore, how 
much power the turbine will be generating). Proponents of wind and 
solar power argue that a suite of geographically distributed wind and 
solar power plants could be counted on to serve a specified level of load 
reliably because the sun won’t stop shining, or the wind stop blowing, 
everywhere at the same time.117 
3. Environmental Externalities 
All electric generation technologies produce negative 
environmental externalities—harm to health, safety, and the 
environment over their full life cycle.118 Extracting coal, natural gas, 
uranium, and silicon (or other minerals used in manufacturing PV cells) 
creates safety hazards for workers as well as air, water, and soil 
pollution. Manufacturing power plant components and PV cells, not to 
mention the construction of generating facilities themselves, entails 
additional risks. Fossil-fueled, nuclear, and concentrated solar power 
all use large amounts of water. Fossil-fueled combustion discharges 
pollutants into the air, produces water effluent, and, in the case of coal 
combustion, generates solid wastes (such as coal ash). Hydroelectric 
facilities interrupt fish migration routes, flood land, change water 
chemistry, and interrupt scenic vistas, as do wind farms. The list goes 
on. 
 
01-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/D6PX-FCDD] (concluding significant electric generator outages 
occurred during polar vortex, often related to gas curtailments, lack of fuel diversity, and frozen 
coal). 
 116.  See EIA LCOE ESTIMATES, supra note 82, at 6 tbl.1. 
 117.  See e.g., MICHAEL MILLIGAN & RORY ARTIG, RELIABILITY BENEFITS OF DISPERSED WIND 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 2, 9 (1998). 
 118.  For a source-by-source overview of these externalities and the regulatory regimes 
governing them, see generally EISEN ET AL., supra note 44. 
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Here, we explore the externalities of electricity generation that 
produce the most salient and direct harms to human health and the 
environment.119 Of course, many of these harms are better conceived of 
as risks, characterized by a predicted magnitude of harm multiplied by 
the probability that the harm will occur.120 Researchers can thus 
conduct risk assessments of the adverse health impacts resulting from 
the air emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion or characterize 
the water quality risks associated with the discharge of heat in effluent 
from thermal power plants. There is often a gap between risk as 
assessed mathematically and risk as perceived by stakeholders—a topic 
we examine in more detail in Part II. 
First, it is well established that air emissions from fossil-fueled 
combustion entail significant risks to health and the environment. Coal 
combustion, in particular, emits carbon dioxide (CO2, the most common 
greenhouse gas), and nitrogen oxides (NOx, precursors of both acid rain 
and ground-level ozone (smog)); so does natural gas, though in smaller 
amounts.121 In addition, coal combustion is a major source of emissions 
of: (a) sulfur dioxide (SO2, a precursor of acid rain), (b) particulate 
matter (PM, an inhalation hazard), and (c) mercury (Hg, ingestion of 
which poses a risk to neurological development).122 Methane—the 
primary component of natural gas—is itself a greenhouse gas far more 
potent than CO2.123 Indeed, even though coal combustion emits twice 
the carbon dioxide of natural gas combustion, there is an ongoing 
scientific debate over whether coal-fired or natural gas-fired power 
produces more GHG emissions over its full life cycle.124 Natural gas, 
however, produces a tiny fraction of the deadly PM emitted by coal 
combustion. Of course, EPA regulates all of these emissions to at least 
 
 119.  We so limit our analysis with some hesitation. The externalities associated with fuel 
extraction (coal, natural gas, uranium, and silicon) and hydropower development are considerable. 
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY 64–153 (2010) 
(providing analysis of electricity fuels); James Conca, How Deadly is Your Kilowatt? We Rank the 
Killer Energy Sources, FORBES (June 10, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
jamesconca/2012/06/10/energys-deathprint-a-price-always-paid/ [http://perma.cc/DQZ5-9K6S] 
(considering entire fuel cycle).  
 120.  See infra Section II.B. (describing differences between risk assessment, risk perception, 
and risk management). 
 121.  Natural gas-combustion produces half the CO2 emissions of coal combustion and “a small 
fraction” of the NOx emissions. EISEN ET AL., supra note 44, at 258. 
 122.  Natural gas combustion produces “a small fraction” of the amounts of SO2 and PM 
produced by coal combustion, and no mercury emissions. Id. 
 123.  Ramon A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas 
Infrastructure, 109 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 6435, 6435 (2012). 
 124.  See generally id. (summarizing these issues). 
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some extent under the Clean Air Act,125 though its GHG emissions 
regulation is neither finally determined nor fully implemented.126 
Second, coal-fired and nuclear power production entail 
particularly thorny waste disposal issues. For coal-fired power, the 
problem is coal combustion residuals, a high-volume waste127 commonly 
called fly ash,128 and the storage of which has resulted in several high-
profile spills of toxic ash into rivers over the last decade.129 These 
accidents triggered an EPA decision to regulate coal ash storage and 
disposal under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”).130  For nuclear power the problem is spent fuel and other 
radioactive wastes. These include low-level wastes, which are produced 
in relatively high volumes but which pose less danger to human health 
and the environment, and high-level wastes, especially the used nuclear 
fuel itself, which are currently being stored across the country in spent 
fuel pools or canisters.131 Both are highly regulated, but continue to 
perpetuate decades-long political and legal conflicts.132 
 
 125.  Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (regulating PM, NOx and SO2 as conventional 
pollutants). For a description of that regulatory scheme, see David B. Spence & Emily Hammond, 
Electric Power Generation Fuels, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW (Jody Freeman & 
Michael Gerrard eds., 2d ed. 2014). EPA just recently began to regulate mercury emissions from 
coal-fired plants; however, those regulations were held arbitrary and capricious in Michigan v. 
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).  
 126.  See Freeman & Spence, supra note 22, at 28–42 (2014) (summarizing EPA’s efforts).  
 127.  See AM. COAL ASH ASS’N, 2012 COAL COMBUSTION PRODUCT (CCP) PRODUCTION & USE 
SURVEY REPORT, http://www.acaa-usa.org/Portals/9/Files/PDFs/ 
revisedFINAL2012CCPSurveyReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/5NC6-TK9H] (showing that in 2012, 
coal-fired power plants in the United States generated over 109 million tons of CCRs). 
 128.  Spence & Hammond, supra note 125, at 472–73 (explaining that when coal is burned for 
electricity generation, it creates both “fly ash”—the PM that is collected in pollution control 
equipment under the CAA—and “bottom ash”—the heavier ashes that are too heavy to be airborne 
and that are collected through the bottom of coal furnaces.  It can contain a variety of heavy metals 
like lead, arsenic, and chromium). 
 129.  See, e.g., Cape Fear River Watch, Inc. v. Duke Energy Progress, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 3d 798, 
812 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (granting in part and denying in part Duke Energy’s motion to dismiss CWA 
complaint involving coal ash spill); see also Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: 
Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35128, 35146–48 
(June 21, 2010) (describing additional catastrophic spills). For EPA’s final rule, see Hazardous and 
Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 
80 Fed. Reg. 21302 (Dec. 19, 2014). 
 130.  Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal Combustion 
Residuals From Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (June 31, 2010); see Scott Judy, Duke Energy 
Fined $102M for Clean Water Act Violations, ENG’R. NEWS-REC., May 14, 2015, 
http://enr.construction.com/infrastructure/environment/2015/0514-duke-energy-fined-102m-for-
clean-water-act-violations.asp [http://perma.cc/7FGL-2L3Z] (describing settlement with 
Department of Justice for CWA crimes and showing that the CWA also provides a means for 
enforcement). 
 131.  See Spence & Hammond, supra note 125, at 486–87. 
 132.  See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021c 
(2012); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (invalidating portions of the Act on 
Tenth Amendment grounds). Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the 
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* * * 
As is evident from the discussion above, the three attributes in 
our framework—cost, reliability/flexibility, and environmental 
externalities—are not uniformly distributed amongst the fuel sources 
for electricity. We turn now to a diagnostic account of the theory and 
practice of markets and regulation. This discussion helps situate the 
interaction of our three attributes within the economic literature, and 
also suggests reasons why the electricity markets have difficulty 
minimizing cost and environmental externalities while also maximizing 
reliability/flexibility. 
D. Markets: Theory and Practice 
The under-supply of sufficiently reliable and green power is a 
frequent lament in energy policy circles. Economic theory tells us that 
a well-functioning competitive market will maximize social net benefits, 
thereby providing society with a generation mix that balances cost, 
reliability/flexibility, and environmental attributes133 in a way that 
maximizes our collective utility.134 According to that view, regulation 
ought to be aimed at getting prices “right” and otherwise creating 
conditions that mimic textbook competition.135 An alternative view 
places less faith in the ability of markets to produce socially optimal 
outcomes and insists on a role for government intervention in markets 
to correct certain kinds of market failures.136 
In particular, many economists prescribe getting prices right as 
the solution to electric reliability problems. More specifically, some 
economists worry that in competitive wholesale markets, prices based 
 
Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1764–810 (2012) (summarizing the history of high-level 
waste policy in the United States) [hereinafter Hammond, Deference Dilemma]; see also Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–270 (2012) (designating Yucca Mountain as geologic 
repository for high-level waste); In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 261–67  (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(mandating that NRC continue with licensing process for Yucca Mountain). 
 133.  We use the term “attributes” here because a perfect market would not produce 
externalities, which are a form of market failure.  
 134.  More specifically, such a market will produce a distribution of goods that is Pareto 
optimal, in that no other distribution of goods can make one or more members better off without 
making one or more members worse off. See GEORGE C. HOMANS & CHARLES CURTIS, JR., AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PARETO 277–81 (1934). 
 135.  See generally LYNN KEISLING DEREGULATION, INNOVATION, AND MARKET 
LIBERALIZATION: ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING ENVIRONMENT (2008) 
(conceptualizing electricity markets as complex adaptive systems in which price signals will 
stimulate innovation and create value). 
 136.  See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 22, at 1620 (conceptualizing the electricity markets as a 
“common, collective enterprise of building and elaborating the institutions, regulatory structures, 
and business models that will be necessary to realize a low-carbon future”). 
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on marginal costs will not attract sufficient investment in new 
capacity—referred to as the “missing money” problem.137 The reason 
that money is “missing,” they say, is because consumers are insulated 
from the movement of wholesale prices by fixed-price retail contracts or 
tariffs, and because many wholesale markets operate under price caps 
imposed by regulators.138 In the economist’s perfect world, all users 
(including residential, commercial, and industrial consumers) would be 
equipped with smart meters enabling both wholesale and retail power 
prices to fluctuate freely in real time (so-called “dynamic pricing”), 
thereby allowing both supply and demand to respond to price changes. 
Temporary price spikes would induce immediate demand reductions, 
and ultimately, lower prices; if not, sustained high prices would provide 
a sufficient reward for investment in adequate generation resources, 
ensuring reliability.139 
Even where smart meters enable retailers to offer dynamic 
pricing, full implementation has remained elusive, notwithstanding 
that numerous pilot studies have demonstrated its benefits.140  Many 
consumers seem to prefer the security of fixed-price contracts, fearing 
downside risks and failing to appreciate the possibility of saving money 
in the long run.141 This same loss aversion dynamic may influence 
prospective investors in power plants even more powerfully, not only for 
behavioral reasons142 but for logical reasons as well. Economists 
describe the problem as one of “asset specificity.” In a competitive 
market, when a firm’s assets are constructed at a particular location for 
a particular purpose, that firm faces the risk that its contractual 
counterparties (those from whom it buys or to whom it sells) will act 
opportunistically, taking advantage of the firm’s lack of alternative 
 
 137.  Peter Cramton & Steven Stoft, The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate 
Generating Capacity: A White Paper for the California Electricity Oversight Board 8–11 (Apr. 25, 
2006), http://works.bepress.com/cramton/34/ [http://perma.cc/7RFS-RPZH] (describing the missing 
money problem). 
 138.  See id. (providing examples); Pierce, supra note 77, at 468–77 (canvassing state 
restructuring experiences). 
 139.  See Hogan, supra note 58, at 6–8 (explaining idealized energy-only model). 
 140.  See, e.g., Ahmad Faruqui & Jennifer Palmer, Dynamic Pricing and Its Discontents, 34 
REGULATION 16 (2011). 
 141.  See Antoine Bechara et al., The Role of the Amygdala in Decision-Making, 985 ANN. N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 356, 389–99 (2003) (supporting the notion that the fear of loss invokes the emotional 
part of the brain, leading people to pay to avoid downside risk); Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding 
Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293, 1294 (1997) (same). 
 142.  We can distinguish loss aversion from risk aversion. See JAMES MONTIER, BEHAVIOURAL 
INVESTING:  A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE TO APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 447–52 (2007) 
(explaining the behavioral psychology risk aversion literature and its impacts on investment 
decisions). 
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options to “hold up” the firm on price.143 Power plants are characterized 
by asset specificity: they are often capital intensive, geographically 
immobile investments.144 In these situations, it might be inaccurate to 
assume that arms-length transactions in the market will produce more 
efficient outcomes than would vertical integration.145 One might 
therefore expect risk-averse investors to be more reluctant to invest in 
power plants in competitive electricity markets and for this dynamic to 
be particularly strong for especially long-lived investments with 
especially large up-front costs, such as nuclear (and to a lesser extent, 
coal-fired) power plants. Indeed, energy consultants contend that this 
dynamic is accelerating the reduction in fuel diversity, exacerbating 
grid reliability problems.146 A future grid consisting mostly of gas-fired 
and renewable power (the only technologies experiencing growth) poses 
reliability challenges for grid operators. Integrating intermittent 
sources like wind and solar on a larger scale makes grid balancing more 
difficult. Gas-fired plants can back up wind because they can ramp 
efficiently, but they face their own reliability challenges: they cannot 
store fuel on site, are at the mercy of pipelines for supply, and natural 
gas prices have tended to be more volatile than fuel prices for any other 
generation source. In sum, the combination of incentives posed by the 
markets as they currently operate may decrease reliability over time. 
Markets also struggle with pricing externalities, and the 
economics literature on environmental externalities has long 
recognized pollution as a kind of market (or pricing) failure.  That 
literature goes back to Arthur C. Pigou147 and generally endorses 
pollution taxation as the most efficient way to internalize 
environmental externalities, with marketable permits as a second-best 
 
 143.  Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical 
Evidence, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: THE ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 121–22 
(Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297–325 (1978) 
(noting the particular trouble that asset specificity poses for spot markets). 
 144.  Arguably, increased transmission capabilities would assuage this immobility somewhat. 
 145.  Joskow, supra note 143, at 123–25 (noting that asset specificity was the norm in the 
electricity industry, Joskow argued prior to restructuring that reliance on anonymous spot market 
transactions to supply electricity is likely to fail “because the sinking of relationship-specific 
investments transforms a large numbers bargaining situation into a small numbers bargaining 
situation ex post,” creating opportunities for buyers or sellers to extract rents from the other and 
a consequent disincentive to invest in capacity).   
 146.  The Value of US Power Supply Diversity, www.IHS.COM (last visited Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.ihs.com/info/0714/power-diversity-special-report.html [http://perma.cc/9QG2-64XH].  
 147.  ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 185–226 (AMS Press 1978) (1920). 
Pigou is commonly credited with providing the first argument in favor of pollution taxes to force 
polluters to internalize pollution costs they would otherwise shift to society. 
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alternative.148 The Coase Theorem challenged the Pigovian prescription 
by arguing that governments are unlikely to get taxation levels right; 
instead it posits that if property rights are assigned to conflicting 
parties, they will negotiate an outcome more likely to maximize social 
benefits.149 Others have been skeptical of market solutions; Garrett 
Hardin’s famous “tragedy of the commons” analysis offered government 
regulation as the solution to such problems.150 
In practice, American policymakers have historically eschewed 
market incentives as well as private litigation for resolving pollution 
problems.151 Instead, prescriptive and proscriptive rules have been the 
norm—what most economists refer to somewhat derisively as 
command-and-control regulation. Most of the CAA’s approach to 
regulating emissions from electricity generation falls into this category, 
as does the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (“NRC”) licensing regime 
for nuclear power plants.152 The seemingly intractable difficulty of 
environmental law is that these pollutant- and industry-specific 
regimes represent ad hoc responses to the externality problem, 
producing neither socially optimal pollution levels nor a level playing 
field among generators competing in wholesale electricity markets. For 
example, various studies reveal coal combustion to produce negative 
social net benefits, imposing large mortality, morbidity, and 
environmental costs on society from non-GHG air pollutants alone.153  
One study estimated such costs at $53 billion per year, compared to less 
 
 148.  See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 134–52 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988); DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES 110–17 (1990); PIGOU, supra note 147, at 185–89 (addressing 
the problem of smoke produced by factory chimneys in England in the early twentieth century); 
id. at 187 n.2. Within EPA, economists have championed the case of market-based regulation since 
the early 1970s. Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PUB. INTEREST 69, 
70–78 (1970). 
 149.  See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) 
(basing the conclusion on some stylized assumptions, including that the transaction costs of 
negotiating were zero). 
 150.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1247 (1968); see also Coase, 
supra note 149, at 18 (noting unrealistic nature of assumption that transaction costs of bargaining 
to a solution are zero, and that it “is normally the case [that] a large number of people are involved 
and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market or the firm may be 
high”). 
 151.  The major exceptions are the acid rain program enacted by Congress in 1990, which 
employs a marketable permit regime to effect reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions, and the use of 
renewable energy credits in many state RPS programs. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 44, ch. 5.   
 152.  See infra Section II.A. 
 153.  E.g., Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United 
States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1669–70 (2011); see also sources cited supra note 119 
(comparing life-cycle costs of various fuels).  
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than $1 billion per year for natural gas.154 Thus, numerous sources 
argue that the regulated levels of air emissions permitted by the CAA 
for coal-fired power are too high.155 Nuclear and renewables, of course, 
emit none of those same pollutants.156 
In sum, the last few decades have seen both increasing reliance 
on markets and competition in public utility regulation and stricter 
environmental regulation of energy production facilities. These changes 
have taken place in a piecemeal, incremental manner, with little 
attention to how they interact.157 As a result, the regulatory contract 
has been transformed; in the markets, short-run marginal cost has been 
elevated at the expense of reliability/flexibility and environmental 
attributes.158 This transformation has produced numerous 
dysfunctions. The story of nuclear power provides a cogent example of 
how and why that is. 
II. NUCLEAR POWER IN THE MARKETPLACE 
As set forth in Part I, nuclear power is a low-carbon, highly 
reliable base load technology.  Although it has limited ramping 
capability and high capital costs, its environmental and reliability 
attributes, combined with its relatively low short-run variable costs, 
suggest that it ought to be able to compete on all three components of 
our tripartite framework—costs, reliability/flexibility, and 
environmental externalities. Yet some plants are struggling to stay 
competitive in wholesale markets, and there has been little new 
construction activity. In this Part, we examine more closely the federal 
nuclear regulatory regime and its interaction with modern electricity 
 
 154.  Muller et al., supra note 153, at 1669. 
 155.   Id. at 1672; see also Paul R. Epstein, et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of 
Coal, 1219 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 93 (2011) (positing that if coal’s externalities were 
internalized, the price of electricity from that source would double or triple); Melissa Fry Konty & 
Jason Bailey, The Impact of Coal on the Kentucky State Budget, MTN. ASS’N FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., 
http://www.maced.org/coal/documents/Impact_of_Coal-Exec_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
3XEF-VWF6] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (concluding net benefits of coal were negative); Press 
Release, National Academy of Sciences, Report Examines Hidden Health and Environmental 
Costs of Energy Production and Consumption in U.S. (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/resource-database/NAS%20study%20on%20costs%20of 
%20energy.pdf [http://perma.cc/LMS7-3PTU] (estimating annual non-climate related external 
damages from 406 coal-fired power plants to be $62 million, or about 3.2 cents per KWh).  
 156.  Muller et al., supra note 153, at 1669. 
 157.  ISSER, supra note 43, at 462–63; see also William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory 
Commons:  A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 22–27 (2003) (theorizing regulatory 
gaps that develop resulting from numerous regulators sharing jurisdiction over regulatory spheres 
and the resulting failure to remedy social ills).  
 158.  As we shall explain infra Part III, the transformation of the regulatory contract is not 
limited to power generators operating in wholesale markets.   
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markets. We then develop an account of the nuclear risk premium and 
show how it relates to the story of nuclear power both historically and 
today by influencing the competitiveness of nuclear power. Although 
nuclear power provides a stark example, it assists in our development 
of a concrete narrative that shows how the regulatory contract is 
increasingly strained in the marketplace. 
A. Federal Nuclear Power Regulation 
As a high-capital cost, low-fuel cost, dependable source of 
electricity, nuclear power is similar to coal-fired power, the other 
traditional base load source of electricity. However, nuclear power 
produces far fewer externalities than coal-fired power. Indeed, the 
existing nuclear regulatory regime has minimized such externalities far 
more effectively than environmental regulation has for nuclear power’s 
base load competitors.159 Congress and the nuclear agencies developed 
this regulatory regime, however, against the implicit assumption that 
the traditional regulatory contract would make this regime 
economically feasible. 
Beginning in 1946, Congress gave the Atomic Energy 
Commission (“AEC”) “decisive control” over the entire field of nuclear 
energy.160 This authority included both military and civilian nuclear 
energy, a lineage that even today contributes to negative risk 
 
 159.  See sources cited supra note 119. For purposes of this section, we focus primarily on 
externalities associated only with electricity generation and describe the regulatory scheme unique 
to nuclear power. Some externalities associated with nuclear power are regulated under the same 
regime as those associated with other thermal generation. For example, both nuclear power and 
fossil-fueled generation must comply with the Clean Water Act’s (CWA’s) intake water and point-
source discharge requirements. EPA National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 122, 125 (2015). Air emissions for nuclear power plants, however, are handled under the NRC 
licensing regime, while those of fossil-fueled plants are subject to the CAA. See Richard Goldsmith, 
Nuclear Power Meets the 101st Congress, A “One-Act” Comedy:  Regulation of Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Licensees Under the Clean Air Act, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 103, 104–17 (1992) (providing 
general overview of the history of relevant regulations). Although new and proposed CAA 
regulations seek to reduce air-emission externalities of fossil-fueled power generation, those 
externalities persist and are not present for nuclear generation. See Muller et al., supra note 153, 
at 1669 (implying that nuclear energy was omitted from analysis because it does not emit the 
pollutants in question). Finally, some states require siting approval for all new generation, 
including environmental assessments and certificates of public convenience and necessity. EDISON 
ELEC. INST., STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION SITING DIRECTORY (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Documents/State_ 
Generation_Transmission_Siting_Directory.pdf [http://perma.cc/K9ZN-3QDZ].   
 160.  H.R. REP. NO. 80-1973, at 3 (1948); see also Edward H. Levi, The Atomic Energy Act:  An 
Analysis, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIS., Sept. 1, 1946, at 18 (describing AEC’s “complete domination over 
atomic energy development in this country”). See generally Dean C. Dunlavey, Government 
Regulation of Atomic Industry, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 295 (1957) (providing a comprehensive, 
contemporaneous review of AEA of 1954). 
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perceptions of nuclear power and mistrust of AEC’s successor agency, 
the NRC.161 Intent on emphasizing civilian nuclear power development, 
Congress shifted AEC’s mandate in 1954, and the agency’s primary 
policy mission became facilitating the emergence of the entire civilian 
nuclear power industry.162 Most of the American fleet of commercial 
reactors commenced construction in the 1960s and 70s, a period in 
which the cold-war threat of nuclear annihilation loomed in the public 
consciousness. As described above, this was also a period in which cost-
of-service ratemaking encouraged capital investment in generation and 
transmission.163 
The Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) vests responsibility with NRC 
for licensing nuclear power plants and ensuring their “adequate 
safety.”164 The licensing process is thorough, strict, and resource-
intensive; it comprises site selection, design, and construction and 
operating phases.165 Applicants must perform environmental reviews 
as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)166 and 
various generic rules NRC has issued over the years.167 Applicants must 
either be regulated public utilities or satisfy stringent financial 
qualifications to engage in the proposed activities,168 and at the 
 
 161.  See, e.g., TERRENCE R. FEHNER & F.G. GOSLING, DEP’T OF ENERGY, ATMOSPHERIC 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING, 1951-1963, at 109–10 (2006), http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ 
DOENTSAtmospheric.pdf [http://perma.cc/AP3R-TVTH] (describing thousands of dead sheep and 
other concerns about fallout from above-ground testing); Hammond, supra note 132, at 1780–81 
(describing concerns about AEC that motivated creation of NRC). 
 162.  Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–
2297h-13 (2006 & Supp. 2009)); see Hammond, supra note 132, at 1780 (describing the history and 
structure of AEC). 
 163.  See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1062 (1962) (arguing that a cost-of-service approach leads to 
overinvestment in capital); see also Leon Courville, Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility 
Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 53, 72–73 (1974) (demonstrating this effect for power 
plants). But see W. Davis Dechert, Has the Averch-Johnson Effect Been Theoretically Justified?, 8 
J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1, 16 (1984) (suggesting regulated firms under-invest in capital 
compared to unregulated firms). 
 164.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2232 (2012).  
 165.  A prospective licensee may choose one of two procedural paths for obtaining the 
necessary licenses. The traditional path is set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 50 (2015); the newer path is set 
forth at id. § 52. See EISEN ET AL., supra note 44, at ch. 7; see also Nuclear Info. Res. Serv. v. NRC, 
969 F.2d 1169, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (upholding part 52 licensing scheme). 
 166.  See 10 C.F.R. § 51.20 (2015) (listing types of actions requiring EIS under NRC’s NEPA 
implementing regulations). 
 167.  See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 101 (1983) (noting “administrative 
efficiency and consistency of decision” are benefits of such generic rules). 
 168.  On the history of the financial qualifications requirement, see Emily Hammond Meazell, 
Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1760–63 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hammond, Dialogue]; see also Coal. for the Env’t v. NRC, 795 F.2d 168, 170–73 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (detailing agency and court actions over time). 
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beginning of operations they must provide “reasonable assurances” that 
funds will be available for the plant’s eventual decommissioning—
which typically involves creating a trust fund.169 In addition, operators 
must obtain the maximum amount of liability insurance that can be 
purchased on the market.170  Finally, operators must pay for waste 
management, typically storing it onsite. Until 2013, licensees made 
payments to the Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act in anticipation of sending spent fuel and other high-
level radioactive wastes to a deep geological disposal site in Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada.171 After development of Yucca Mountain stalled, the 
D.C. Circuit ordered DOE to stop collecting these funds,172 but operators 
are nevertheless responsible for the costs of managing spent fuel onsite 
during operation and after decommissioning.173 
The process imposes other costs on applicants and licensees that 
are not apparent from the outset. First, as plants age and licenses are 
renewed, replacement parts and upgrades will be needed. Second, 
during the lifetime of a license, NRC retains authority to modify or 
revoke the license if necessary to ensure adequate protection.174 
Moreover, NRC may not consider costs when determining what 
constitutes adequate protection.175 Thus, NRC may unilaterally modify 
or add to existing licensed facilities’ requirements (known as 
“backfitting”)176 in order to assure adequate protection without a cost-
 
 169.  10 C.F.R. § 50.75 (2015); see Pennington v. ZionSolutions LLC, 742 F.3d 715, 716–17  
(7th Cir. 2014). 
 170.  See The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012). If a 
nuclear accident occurs, this primary insurance provides the cap on nuclear power plant liability; 
taxpayers bear any excess. Id. § 2210(4)(A). The Act creates a fund that is administered by 
modifying the traditional the civil justice system in the event of an accident. See Duke Power Co. 
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 59–61 (1978) (upholding Price-Anderson Act against 
constitutional challenges). 
 171.  Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 10101–270 (2012). 
 172.  Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. DOE, 736 F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
 173.  For an overview of these costs, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-141, SPENT 
NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT:  OUTREACH NEEDED TO HELP GAIN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR 
FEDERAL ACTIVITIES THAT ADDRESS LIABILITY app. V  (2014) (showing capital costs in tens of 
millions and annual operating costs at $100,000 to $300,000 for operating sites and $2.5 million 
to $6.5 million at shutdown reactor sites). 
 174.  42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012); see Carstens v. NRC, 742 F.2d 1546, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(emphasizing standard does not require zero risk); see also Nader v. Ray, 363 F. Supp. 946, 954 
(D.D.C. 1973) (rejecting “complete,” “entire,” or “perfect” assurance of safety). 
 175.  See Union of Concerned Scientists. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists I), 824 F.2d 108, 114 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In setting or enforcing the standard of “adequate protection” that this section 
requires, the Commission may not consider the economic costs of safety measures.”). 
 176.  10 C.F.R. § 50.109 (2015). 
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benefit analysis.177 Thus, even after licenses are granted and operators 
have internalized the costs described above, operators remain open to 
costly, unpredictable modification requirements for the lifetime of their 
licenses.178 For example, following Fukushima, NRC considered a 
potential backfit modification estimated by the agency to require $15–
30 million per reactor unit; industry argued the cost would be as much 
as twice that amount.179 The possibility of added costs introduces an 
important element of risk into nuclear investments. 
When one considers the many costs associated with siting, 
constructing, operating, and decommissioning a nuclear power plant, 
one can see why the levelized costs for nuclear are so high.180 Simply 
stated, nuclear regulation requires owners of nuclear power plants to 
internalize more of their externalities than other sources of generation. 
Waste products, as discussed above, provide an example. Coal’s CCRs 
contain a variety of heavy metals but are not regulated as hazardous 
wastes under RCRA.181 As explained in Part I, CCRs are generated at 
a pace of more than one hundred million tons per year, and poor 
disposal practices have caused several catastrophic incidents.182 Spent 
nuclear fuel, on the other hand, must be contained in extraordinarily 
robust fuel pools or dry casks that are regulated under the same 
defense-in-depth principles underlying nuclear generation facilities 
 
 177.  If NRC determines that a particular course of action will lead to substantial 
enhancements beyond adequate protection, however, it will engage in a cost-benefit analysis. 
Union of Concerned Scientists. v. NRC (Concerned Scientists II), 880 F.2d 552, 556–57 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (upholding two-pronged approach to backfitting). NRC issued several backfit orders in 
response to lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster. E.g., Order Modifying Licenses With 
Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, NRC 
EA-12-049 (Mar. 12, 2012) (making adequate protection finding); see also Order to Modify Licenses 
With Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation Under Severe 
Accident Conditions, NRC EA-13-109 (June 6, 2013) (making substantial enhancements finding). 
See generally Emily Hammond, Nuclear Power, Risk, and Retroactivity, 48 VAND. J.  TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1059 (2015) (evaluating NRC response to Fukushima and implications of backfitting rules). 
 178.  This possibility was a source of concern early in the AEA’s history. See Dunlavey, supra 
note 160, at 331 (“Most of these powers over the licensee provide no compensation to him for 
interrupting his business.”).   
 179.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-98, NRC NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS COST 
ESTIMATES BY INCORPORATING MORE BEST PRACTICES 3 (Dec. 2014). After industry complaints, 
the GAO was asked to investigate and report on NRC’s cost estimate methods generally, and this 
particular estimate specifically. The GAO concluded that the cost estimate “is not reliable because 
it did not fully or substantially meet any of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate.” Id. 
at 15. 
 180.  See supra Section I.C.1. 
 181.  Instead, EPA has chosen the lighter-handed regulation it reserves for solid (non-
hazardous) wastes. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System: Disposal of Coal 
Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 40 C.F.R. § 257, 261 (2014). 
 182.  See supra Section I.C.3. 
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themselves; this approach has an extremely impressive safety record.183 
And as described above, for years operators have also paid into the 
Nuclear Waste Fund for ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel. 
Decommissioning provides another example. Nuclear power 
operators must uniformly pay in advance for decommissioning costs 
that may occur more than sixty years in the future.184  By contrast, the 
experience of fossil-fueled and renewable power varies by state. In some 
states, generators seek permission to recover costs of decommissioning 
only once the decision to close a plant has been made.185 Others require 
that bonds be posted at some date near the end of the expected life of 
the project; for example, the Oklahoma Wind Energy Development Act 
requires owners of wind energy facilities to provide evidence of financial 
security to cover decommissioning costs after the fifteenth year of 
operation.186 In these and other ways, nuclear power internalizes costs 
that other sources of generation frequently do not.  In the next section, 
we explore why that is. 
B. The Nuclear Power Risk Premium 
Because of their complexity and size, nuclear plants would be 
expensive in any event.187 However, we hypothesize that nuclear 
power’s price tag is higher than would be economically efficient because 
 
 183.  See Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 10 C.F.R. § 51 (2014) (finding reasonable 
assurances of the safety of long-term spent fuel storage); id. (presenting table showing no 
noticeable predicted environmental impacts associated with short- or long-term storage, in nearly 
every category considered); see, e.g., U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, NUREG-2157, GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR CONTINUED STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL app. E, 
at E-24 (2014) (presenting seven known incidents of spent fuel pool leaks and noting no releases 
have affected health of public).  
 184.  See supra text accompanying note 169. 
 185.  E.g., In re the Application of Consumers Energy Co. for a Fin. Order Approving the 
Securitization of Qualified Costs, Case No. U-17473 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Sept. 9, 2013) 
(seeking authority to issue bonds to pay for decommissioning of three coal-fired power plants); id. 
Op. & Order (Dec. 6, 2013) (granting in part and denying in part). 
 186.  See Oklahoma Wind Energy Development Act of 2011, OKLA. STAT. tit. 17 § 160.14 (2012) 
(requiring decommissioning); id. § 160.15 (allowing evidence of financial security in the form of a 
bond, parent guaranty, or letter of credit). But see Paul Monies, Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission Ends Wind Inquiry, Calls for Rules on Decommissioning of Turbines, THE 
OKLAHOMAN (Dec. 2, 2014), http://newsok.com/article/5372275 [http://perma.cc/LBK3-JNMS] 
(stating that no rules have been promulgated under decommissioning provisions of statute; none 
of the state’s wind farms has yet sought decommissioning). 
 187.  As should be evident, our discussion here refers to commercial reactors currently in 
operation or under construction. Small modular reactors (SMRs) and other fourth-generation 
reactors hold promise, but they are not currently commercially viable. Cf. infra Section III.C.1 
(discussing potential regulatory initiatives to speed SMR entry into the marketplace).  
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it includes what we refer to as a “nuclear risk premium.”188 Economists 
have provided estimates of the increased costs facing new nuclear 
construction stemming from uncertainty about the regulatory 
landscape, construction timetables, and future prices of competing 
energy fuels like natural gas.189 In addition, risk perception operates as 
an explanatory variable for understanding not only those increased 
costs but also the robust licensing scheme described above. Scholars 
have documented that risk perception mechanisms can lead to 
inefficient levels of regulation.190 This sort of inefficiency is present in 
the nuclear power regime, further undermining its cost competitiveness 
in the wholesale market. 
 First, we note that risk theory incorporates three distinct 
concepts: assessment, perception, and mitigation. Risk assessment—
sometimes called engineering risk—is a methodology leading to an 
understanding of the probability that a hazard will manifest and the 
magnitude of the expected harm.191 NRC uses probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) to evaluate risks associated with nuclear reactors.192  
For example, its first study of this nature was issued in 1975 and 
considered accident risks based on the frequency of initiating events 
and their expected consequences.193  Following the Three Mile Island 
(“TMI”) accident, NRC began developing and applying increasingly 
 
 188.  As used in economic assessments of nuclear power, the “nuclear risk premium” refers to 
the cost of uncertainty and relates to investor reluctance to invest in more nuclear power given 
regulatory, construction, and fuel mix uncertainties. See MIT STUDY (2009 update), supra note 84, 
at 8 (outlining the difficulties of eliminating the “risk premium”). Our usage is slightly different in 
that it incorporates risk perception as an additional explanatory variable.    
 189.  Id. 
 190.  STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 3–29 (1993) (arguing that various defects lead to irrational regulation); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 69 (2005) (“[R]egulators may 
end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intensive emotional reactions are 
making people relatively insensitive to the (low) probably that dangers will ever come to fruition.”).  
 191.  See Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK 
ANALYSIS 11, 11–27 (1981) (setting forth quantitative definition of risk); Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, 
Risk and Uncertainty Analysis in Government Safety Decisions, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 633, 635–36 
(2002) (providing examples of probabilistic risk analysis). Notwithstanding the quantitative 
engineering methodologies that underlie risk assessment, the verbal formulation described above 
it familiar to legal jurisprudence, as demonstrated most famously by the Hand Formula.  See 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (expressing risk assessment 
algebraically). 
 192.  See NRC FACT SHEET, PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (Oct. 2007), 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/probabilistic-risk-asses.html 
[http://perma.cc/4X8S-2USW] (explaining that probabilistic risk assessment seeks to quantify 
discrete risks as well as how those risks interact in a complex system).   
 193.  NRC, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U.S. COMMERCIAL 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, NUREG-75/014 (WASH-1400) (Oct. 1975), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr75-014/ [http://perma.cc/R7RR-8XGA]. 
        
180 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1:141 
rigorous methods of risk assessment and explicitly committed to 
quantitative risk assessment methods.194 NRC’s Part 52 licensing 
procedures require applicants to perform a PRA and provide supporting 
analyses for design certifications and combined licenses.195 
Risk mitigation—reducing the magnitude or likelihood of an 
anticipated hazard—is a fundamental goal of the licensing regime.196 
NRC’s risk mitigation philosophy is captured in the term “defense-in-
depth,” a notion that encompasses redundancy and contingency 
planning197 and implies multiple layers of preventative, mitigation, and 
emergency preparedness measures.198 More specifically, nuclear 
reactors are designed and constructed using particular assumptions 
about the types of hazards that must be mitigated. This analysis uses 
the concepts of “design-basis events” and “beyond-design-basis 
events.”199 The design-basis concept requires facilities to be designed 
with safety systems in place to address both anticipated operational 
events and accidents.200  For example, seismic risks and flooding are 
 
 194.  See NRC, THREE MILE ISLAND:  A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND TO THE PUBLIC, 
NUREG/CR-1250, 147-52 (1980), http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/354.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/ZT8H-PB46] (the “Rogovin Report”) (addressing “increased use of quantitative risk 
assessment techniques”). 
 195.  E.g., 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.47(23), 79(48) (2015). 
 196.  This discussion focuses on the design and construction aspects of mitigating nuclear 
safety risks. However, these technological risk mitigation techniques are only part of the range of 
risk mitigation approaches relevant to this sector. Insurance, for example, is also considered a risk 
mitigation measure. See generally Hank Jenkins-Smith & Howard Kunreuther, Mitigation and 
Benefits Measures as Policy Tools for Siting Potentially Hazardous Facilities: Determinants of 
Effectiveness and Appropriateness, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 2 (2001) (providing additional examples); 
Paul Kleindorfer & Howard Kunreuther, The Complimentary Roles of Mitigation and Insurance 
in Managing Catastrophic Risks, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 727 (1999) (discussing cushions and 
insurance).  
 197.  NRC, MITIGATION OF BEYOND-DESIGN BASIS EVENTS 3, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/ 
operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/emergency-procedures.html [http://perma.cc/AZE4-
KY9V] [hereinafter NRC, MITIGATION] (collecting sources) (last visited Oct. 14, 2015); NRC, 
GLOSSARY: DEFENSE IN DEPTH, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/defense-in-
depth.html [http://perma.cc/Q6U8-APWJ]. 
 198.  NRC, MITIGATION, supra note 197, at 25. But as NRC’s post-Fukushima Near-Term Task 
Force for Lessons Learned (NTTF) determined, the defense-in-depth and PRA approach are not 
efficiently combined in NRC’s regulatory scheme. See NRC, NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  THE NEAR-TERM 
TASK FORCE REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 21 (July 12, 2001), 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf [http://perma.cc/67BX-LPLV] 
[hereinafter NTTF Report] (discussing the benefits of a more organized framework for defense-in-
depth application). Indeed, a major component of the NTTF’s recommendations was to completely 
overhaul the regulatory framework to combine risk assessment and defense-in-depth “more 
formally.” Id.; see also id. at 22 (“The Task Force recommends establishing a logical, systematic, 
and coherent regulatory framework for adequate protection that appropriately balances defense-
in-depth and risk considerations.”). 
 199.  Id. at 15.   
 200.  Id. 
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two hazards contemplated by the design basis.201 Second, beyond-
design-basis events are informally equated with safety enhancements—
that is, requirements beyond adequate protection that would be 
mandated only if their benefits outweighed their costs.202 As new 
information is gleaned, NRC can use backfit orders to require risk 
mitigation updates, prompting the regulatory uncertainty described 
above.203 
Risk perception, the final component of risk theory, is our focus 
here. Risk perception deals with the many mechanisms by which the 
human brain perceives, understands, predicts, and responds to risk. 
Risk theory suggests a strong likelihood that perception imposes 
disproportionate costs on nuclear power in relation to other electricity 
fuel sources. One of the most straightforward ways to understand this 
disproportionality is by reference to research developing the 
“psychometric paradigm.”204 The psychometric paradigm uses 
statistical techniques to organize risk perceptions according to two 
variables.205 The first is the extent to which a risk is dreaded—that is, 
“catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal, inequitable, threatening to future 
generations, not easily reduced, increasing, involuntary and 
[personally] threatening.”206 The second variable relates to the 
familiarity of a risk—that is, its “observability, knowledge, immediacy 
of consequences, and familiarity.”207 Nuclear technology—power, waste 
disposal, and uranium mining—features prominently among the high-
 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id.  
 203.  E.g., Hammond supra note 177 (describing rulemaking and backfitting orders following 
Fukushima); NTTF Report, supra note 198, at 16–17 (describing backfitting following the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the TMI accident).  
 204.  Note that a variety of risk perception mechanisms provide insights into nuclear power; 
we highlight the psychometric paradigm for its demonstrative usefulness. One of the most 
important alternative accounts for risk perception generally is cultural cognition theory (“CCT”), 
which attempts to account for variations among individuals by grouping them into cultural 
worldviews. For example, France is far more accepting of nuclear power than the United States. 
Paul Slovic et al., Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perceptions in 
France and the United States, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES 55, 57 (2000). The French, however, are more likely to hold hierarchical worldviews than 
individualistic Americans. Id. Thus, they are both more accepting of the risks associated with 
nuclear power, and more comfortable with the ability of elite experts to manage those risks. Id. at 
87–90, 93–94, 98; see also MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON 
THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 1–15 (1982) (presenting early work 
on cultural theory). Other risk perception mechanisms relevant to low-probability, high-
consequence risks like nuclear power are collected in SUNSTEIN, supra note 190 (describing the 
availability heuristic, probability neglect, loss aversion, system neglect, and affect, among others).  
 205.  Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 281–82 (1987). 
 206.  Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT: HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181, 199 (1980). 
 207.  Id. 
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dread, low-familiarity risks.208 By contrast, examples of low-dread, 
high-familiarity risks are bicycles, shock from electric appliances, 
recreational boating, chainsaws, and trampolines.209 
The higher a risk scores on the “dread” axis, the more people 
tend to want strict regulation in hopes of reducing that risk.210 And 
indeed, the nuclear licensing scheme is one of the strictest in the United 
States,211 in terms of both the substantive requirements for adequate 
protection and the procedural requirements associated with obtaining 
licenses. The substantive requirements are addressed above, but the 
procedural requirements are worth emphasizing here. Consider the 
famous Vermont Yankee decision,212 which was borne of public 
opposition to nuclear power and the D.C. Circuit’s concern that agencies 
were not taking seriously the public protection mandates of their 
organic statutes.213 Imposing stricter procedures on agencies was 
viewed by some as an appropriate way for courts to police what they 
perceived to be inadequate risk regulation.214 Vermont Yankee clamped 
down on courts’ use of this method,215 but those who oppose nuclear 
power (and other dread risks) are motivated to persistently seek more 
formalized procedures, which generally take more time than less formal 
 
 208.  Slovic, supra note 205, at 282.  
 209.  Id.  
 210.  Id. at 283. 
 211.  Similarly strict and detailed schemes are targeted at other dread risks, such as chemical 
weapons incineration. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 
1974 U.N.T.S. 316 (1993); Chem. Weapons Working Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 
1485, 1487–89 (10th Cir. 1997) (describing the Army’s implementing process); Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement and Record of Decision, 53 Fed. Reg. 5816 (Feb. 26, 1988) 
(Army’s environmental impact statement for incineration); see also Federal Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 348(f), 355(c)(1)(b) (2012) (discussing formal hearing procedures 
concerning the regulation of unsafe food additives and new drugs). 
 212.  Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
 213.  This history is recounted in Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science 
Obsession, and Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 758–59 
(2011). 
 214.  This use of procedure dates at least to the origins of the APA. See Martin Shapiro, APA: 
Past, Present, & Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 453 (1986) (describing the quasi-legislative and quasi-
adjudicative functions of agencies under the APA); Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the 
APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 98 (1996) (explaining that adoption of the APA “signaled that broad 
delegations of power and combined functions would be tolerated as long as they were checked by 
more extensive procedures”); see also McNollgast [Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry 
R. Weingast], The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 
181 (1999) (“By reducing administrative discretion, formal procedures create transaction costs that 
increase the time and resources needed to change policy.”). 
 215.  But see Jack Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 856, 858–59 (2007) (collecting literature arguing courts continue to impose unwarranted 
obligations on agencies). 
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approaches, notwithstanding that the existing procedures are already 
highly formalized and costly.216 
In addition to attracting substantively and procedurally complex 
regulatory schemes, dread risks are also particularly susceptible to 
“punctuating events,” that is, spectacular, high-profile, low-probability 
events that are processed by the brain as representative of the risks 
posed by a technology generally.217 After Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl, no new nuclear reactors were constructed in the United 
States for over thirty years, and worldwide construction likewise 
sharply declined. The safety questions and backfitting orders raised by 
these events contributed to the notorious construction delays for plants 
in progress. Finally, public opposition to nuclear power grew 
significantly, contributing to regulatory delays and a lack of political 
support for the technology. To be clear, we note that punctuating events 
can highlight needed and appropriate changes.218 But they can also 
prompt knee-jerk responses from elected officials, regulators, and the 
public that contribute to overregulation and regulatory uncertainty.219 
With longstanding and strong opposition finding fresh motivation with 
each punctuating event, agency and industry plans in these areas tend 
to encounter “extensive delay and escalating costs that have been 
widely regarded as attributable to public opposition.”220 
This form of cost uncertainty is extraordinarily difficult to 
quantify,221 but it is certainly present for nuclear power. Of course, 
 
 216.  See Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 343 (1st Cir. 2004). 
Other features of regulatory design, such as redundancy and complexity, likely also relate to risk 
perceptions, but a full account is beyond the scope of this paper. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative 
Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 224 (2011) (“[B]ureaucratic redundancies are most often 
worthwhile when the redundant agency provides a significant benefit by safeguarding against 
high-magnitude harm.”). 
 217.  For an overview of such issues, see generally Paul Slovic, RISK, MEDIA AND STIGMA: 
UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC CHALLENGES TO MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (James Flynn & 
Howard Kunreuther eds., 2001); see also Slovic, supra note 205, at 283–84 (describing enormous 
costs TMI imposed on society in terms of stricter regulation and increased opposition to nuclear 
power, despite that it caused relatively little actual harm).  
 218.  Sea-Coast Anti-Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 690 F.2d 1025, 1028 
(1st Cir. 1982) (describing how Three Mile Island illustrated need for emergency planning for areas 
around nuclear power plants). See generally NTTF Report, supra note 198 (describing 
recommendations in response to Fukushima). 
 219.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 190, at 206; Slovic, supra note 205, at 283–84. 
 220.  Judith Bradbury & Steve Rayner, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, in UNITED NATIONS 
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTEGRATED 
ASSESSMENT AND PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 15, 22 (Hussein Abaza & Andrea 
Baranzini eds., 2002).  
 221.  For a study measuring risk perception’s impact on home values near nuclear shipping 
routes, see Kishore Gawande & Hank Jenkins-Smith, Nuclear Waste Transport and Residential 
Property Values: Estimating the Effects of Perceived Risks, 42 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 207 (2001); 
cf. Santa Fe v. Komis, 845 P.2d 753, 755–62 (N.M. 1992) (permitting additional compensation in 
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perceived risks do encompass some actual risks, which ought to be and 
are mitigated by the robust licensing scheme described above. In 
addition, some of the byproducts of dread serve other functions. 
Heightened agency procedures, for example, are a response to actual 
public concern and in that way serve important ideals that are at the 
core of government legitimacy.222 What this discussion of risk 
perception illustrates, however, is that because nuclear power has 
unique risk perception attributes, it bears costs that other fuel sources 
do not bear. To some extent, this means that nuclear power most fully 
internalizes its costs. But it is also means that the role of risk perception 
cannot be ignored in considering how different electricity fuel sources 
and markets interact. 
C. A Dynamic Account of the Nuclear Risk Premium 
In its first decades of existence, commercial nuclear power went 
from “too cheap to meter” to uncompetitive on today’s wholesale 
markets.223  The nuclear risk premium is part of the reason why, but it 
is also important to understand the historical context in which the risk 
premium arose. Nuclear power plants in operation today were 
constructed on the assumption that electricity demand would 
skyrocket,224 during a period when natural gas-fueled electricity 
generation was banned due to shortages,225 oil prices were escalating, 
and national security was a prominent concern.226 The traditional 
 
takings case for lost value associated with perceived risk of property located on nuclear waste 
shipping route). 
 222.  Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: 
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 320–26 (2013) (mapping 
administrative law onto procedural justice norms).  
 223.  Of course, nuclear power was never actually “too cheap to meter.” Some commentators 
have argued that the phrase itself was essentially propaganda, lacking endorsement even from 
nuclear supporters. See VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY MYTHS AND REALITIES: BRINGING SCIENCE TO THE 
ENERGY POLICY DEBATE at 31–32 (2010) (attributing “too cheap to meter” to a 1954 speech by AEC 
Chairman Lewis L. Strauss to the National Association of Science Writers, and suggesting Strauss 
may have been referring to fusion); SMIL, supra, at 32 (describing a 1955 journal entry of David E. 
Lilienthal, stating that nuclear development “is characterized more by salesmanship, propaganda, 
and overzealousness than sense”). 
 224.  Expectations were for more than a 7% increase annually. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
NUCLEAR PLANT CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES 7 (1983).  
 225.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97–35 § 1021(b), 95 Stat. 616 (1981) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 8341 (2012)); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 
42 U.S.C. § 8312 (repealed 1987). 
 226.  DEP’T. OF ENERGY, REDUCING U.S. OIL VULNERABILITY: ENERGY POLICIES FOR THE 1980’S 
10–11 (1980). For an overview of the forecasts in the 1970s, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The 
Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity , 132 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 497, 500–02 (1984). 
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regulatory contract, complete with rate recovery of costs plus a fair 
return, was the norm. And it appeared both that large amounts of 
capacity would be needed to meet projected demands, and that coal and 
nuclear generation were so cost-superior to oil and natural gas 
generation that the latter two generation sources should be retired.227 
In other words, nuclear power appeared to be the best option for 
consumers. 
Yet the projections that spurred significant investments in 
nuclear power failed to come to fruition. Demand did not increase as 
expected, deregulation of natural gas led to dramatically reduced 
prices, and the oil market did not behave as forecast.228 Nuclear power 
plants turned out to be relatively expensive investments. Further, these 
developments coincided with the TMI accident and the Chernobyl 
disaster, which contributed to negative perceptions and prompted 
additional regulatory action.229 Ultimately, nuclear construction costs 
ran as much as ten times what had been predicted, the timeframe for 
completion stretched to an average of twelve years, and utilities began 
canceling partially completed plants.230 There is some debate about the 
reasons for the significant disparities between projected and actual 
historical costs.231 Most accounts, however, cite regulatory delays, 
redesign requirements, and poor construction management and quality 
control. 232 In any case, these developments posed a challenge to the 
traditional regulatory contract, and some utilities encountered great 
difficulties when they found that they could not necessarily recover 
from their ratepayers (a) the full costs of completed plants233 or (b) the 
costs of canceled plants.234 
 
 227.  Pierce, supra note 226, at 502.  
 228.  See id. at 502–03 (describing outcome of these and other forecasts). 
 229.  See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text (describing the effect of such disasters on 
public opinion and regulatory schemes). Notably, most construction also took place during the Cold 
War, when worries of nuclear annihilation were prominent in the minds of many citizens; it was 
easy to link the imagery of nuclear weapons to nuclear power plants. See Dorothy Nelkin, Anti-
Nuclear Connections: Power and Weapons, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Apr. 1981, at 36, 38–39 
(1981) (linking anti-nuclear power and anti-nuclear proliferation movements). 
 230.  See Pierce, supra note 226, at 504–05. 
 231.  MIT STUDY, supra note 84, at 38. Notably, European reactor construction costs also 
significantly exceeded projections. Id. 
 232.  For example, the part 50 licensing process enabled contentions to be raised and re-raised 
at each licensing phase, contributing to numerous delays. EISEN ET AL., supra note 44, ch. 7; see 
also MIT STUDY, supra note 84, at 38 (describing reasons for disparities between projected and 
actual costs of nuclear construction). 
 233.  See Pierce, supra note 226, at 511–17 (describing state regulatory treatment of completed 
plants). 
 234.  Id. at 517–20 (describing state regulatory treatment of canceled plants). 
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Consider, for example, Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,235 which 
involved the issue of rate recovery for the costs associated with canceled 
nuclear plants. There, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute 
requiring rates to be set without consideration of expenditures for 
plants that were planned but never built.236 The story was typical: 
several utilities planned to construct seven nuclear power plants, but 
determined after the Arab oil embargo and TMI that the plants should 
be cancelled.237 One utility’s share of preliminary construction costs 
exceeded $35 million, and it sought permission from the state PUC to 
recoup those costs in its rates by amortizing them over a ten-year 
period.238 Following an investigation, an administrative law judge 
determined that the expenditures, and the ultimate cancellation, were 
reasonable and prudent at the time they were made.239 But an 
intervening state statute required that construction costs could be 
included in rates only when facilities became “used and useful.”240 
Acknowledging the regulatory contract, the Court began by noting that 
public utilities are bound by a statutory duty to serve the public 
notwithstanding their ownership by private investors.241 But the Court 
refused to intervene on the utilities’ behalf. It recognized that denying 
recovery of plant costs would neither jeopardize the financial integrity 
of a company, nor leave it without sufficient operating capital or with 
the inability to raise future capital.242 In this case, the denied costs 
represented only a small portion of the utility’s overall rate base, 
leaving the utility with a sufficient rate of return.243 
Decisions like Duquesne undermined investors’ expectation that 
the costs involved in obtaining a nuclear operating license would largely 
be borne by ratepayers.244 Cost recovery for completed plants, of course, 
 
 235.  488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
 236.  Id. at 301–02. 
 237.  Id.  
 238.  Id. at 303. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. at 303–05. 
 241.  Id. at 307. 
 242.  Id. at 312. 
 243.  Id. at 311–12. 
 244.  Contributing to the uncertainty are examples to the contrary. See, e.g., Pennington v. 
ZionSolutions LLC, 742 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing how decommissioning trusts are 
typically funded by charges to ratepayers); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 
249, 251 (Fed. Cl. 2006) (referencing ratepayers bearing costs of spent fuel storage and amounts 
paid to Nuclear Waste Fund); Legis. Util. Consumers’ Council v. Pub. Serv. Co., 402 A.2d 626, 633–
39 (N.H. 1979) (upholding state PUC’s inclusion in rate base of construction work-in-progress to 
finance nuclear power plant construction); cf. Grand Council of Crees (of Quebec) v. FERC, 198 
F.3d 950, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the environmental challenge to FERC exercise of 
ratemaking authority was outside the statute’s zone of interests; noting that the environmental 
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had always been subject to certain limitations—most commonly, the 
requirement that an investment be prudent or that a facility be used 
and useful.245  Since investors expected that nuclear plants would be 
necessary to serve growing demand, they never considered the 
possibility that a “prudent” investment might be cancelled—that is, 
that it might never become “used and useful.” 
1. Overcoming Barriers to New Construction 
This history of disappointed rate recovery expectations 
continues to dampen enthusiasm for new nuclear projects.246 In 
regulated states, investors have learned the painful lesson that cost 
recovery is not guaranteed; in restructured states, cost recovery is not 
a feature of the landscape, and the “missing money” problem means 
that wholesale rates are unlikely to incentivize even needed new 
capacity.247 Asset specificity will further disincentivize large capital 
investment.248 Of the 100 reactors operating today, all had broken 
ground by 1977.249 The levelized cost estimates set forth in Part I 
implicitly reflect these concerns, which have only been exacerbated by 
subsequent punctuating events—most recently, the Fukushima 
disaster of 2011.250 
Despite these developments, there has been some movement in 
new reactor construction, though to date new construction is limited to 
 
considerations are relevant “as the need to meet environmental requirements may affect the firm’s 
costs”). For a case involving new nuclear construction, see Georgia Power’s Application for the 
Certification of Units 3 and 4 at Plant Vogtle and Updated Integrated Resource Plan, No. 27,800, 
2010 WL 2647607 (Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n June 17, 2010) (finding that Georgia Power’s proposed 
inclusion of construction work-in-progress in rate base would benefit ratepayers). 
 245.  See Pierce, supra note 226, at 511–13. Many jurisdictions also provide some recovery 
during construction. See, e.g., Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 330–36 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (discussing FERC’s history with the allowance for funds used during construction 
(“AFUDC”) and construction work in progress (“CWIP”) methods of cost recovery).  
 246.  MIT STUDY, supra note 84, at 38 (“[T]he specter of high construction costs has been a 
major factor leading to very little credible commercial interest in investments in new nuclear 
plants.”); cf. Nuclear Energy Inst., Construction Work in Progress: An Effective Financial Tool to 
Lower the Cost of Electricity 3–4 (Feb. 2012), http://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/ 
CWIP.pdf?ext=.pdf [http://perma.cc/M4HH-HL4X] (describing importance of state CWIP 
legislation for nuclear power construction). 
 247.  See supra Section I.D. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Nuclear Reactor Operational Status Tables, Table 3: Nuclear Reactor Characteristics and 
Operational History, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/nuclear/ 
reactors/stats_table3.html [http://perma.cc/XXE5-BC4X]. 
 250.  See NTTF Report, supra note 198, at 7–14 (describing the events that occurred during 
the Fukushima disaster). 
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two traditionally-regulated states251—Georgia and South Carolina.252 
This activity is attributable to several circumstances. First, all of the 
granted and pending license applications were filed in a period from 
2007–09, when natural gas prices (and, therefore, the marginal costs of 
electricity) were high and the hydraulic fracturing boom had not fully 
taken hold.253 In addition, coal was increasingly under scrutiny for its 
GHG emissions, and Congress was considering a number of climate 
change bills that would have increased the cost of emitting GHGs.254 
Second, a number of incentives were also at play.  As described 
in more detail in Part III, both states permitted the nuclear utilities to 
recover the carrying costs of construction through their rates.255  In 
addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) included major 
incentives for new nuclear plants that were focused on lowering the 
risks for first movers.256 These incentives included regulatory risk 
insurance, which authorized DOE to enter into as many as six contracts 
with sponsors of new nuclear power.257 Under these contracts, the 
government promised to pay the principal and interest on debt, as well 
as extra costs incurred for purchasing replacement power due to 
licensing delays.258 Notably, this risk insurance covered agency delay as 
well as litigation expenses, regardless of the ultimately prevailing 
 
 251.  See infra Section III.B (describing state initiatives to rebalance electricity markets). 
 252.  These are, respectively, the Southern Nuclear Operating Company’s Vogtle Units 3 and 
4, and South Carolina Electric and Gas’s V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3. Note that the TVA has also 
resumed construction of its Watts Bar Unit 2, which had been suspended in 1985. See Watts Bar 
Unit 2 Reactivation, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/ 
reactor/wb/watts-bar.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2H7X-2L6D]. Eight 
applications for combined licenses are pending, some of which are for reactors in restructured 
states. Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last updated July 1, 2014) [http://perma.cc/ 
Q7BK-2VPA]. The pending applications are for units in Maryland (restructured), Michigan 
(restructured), Florida, Pennsylvania (restructured), Virginia, and Texas (restructured). Id.  
 253.  U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm [http://perma.cc/4WQ6-ZFKK]. 
 254.  See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007); see also MIT STUDY 
(2009 update), supra note 84, at 6 (emphasizing that including cost of carbon in LCOE estimates 
would make nuclear more competitive with both coal and natural gas). 
 255.  See infra Section III.B. 
 256.  See MIT STUDY (2009 update), supra note 84, at 8–9 (discussing the “risk premium” 
associated with nuclear and need to gain proven experience if premium is to be reduced). 
 257.  42 U.S.C. § 16014 (2012). 
 258.  The regulatory risk insurance was structured so that the first two licensed reactors were 
covered for 100% of these costs (with a $500 million limit), while the next four were covered at 50% 
(with a $250 million limit). See Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant Delays, 10 C.F.R. § 
950.27 (2015). 
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party.259 In this way, federal law aimed, at least briefly, at some of the 
risk-perception induced costs associated with nuclear power.260 
EPAct 2005 also included a nuclear production tax credit for the 
first 6000 MW of new nuclear capacity for the first eight years of 
operation. However, construction was required to begin by January 1, 
2014 to meet eligibility requirements.261 Thus, only the four reactors 
currently under construction meet these criteria. Finally, EPAct 2005 
authorized loan guarantees for clean energy projects, under which the 
federal government can guarantee up to eighty percent of a nuclear 
plant’s estimated costs. To be eligible for such loans, applicants must 
have been granted a combined operating license from NRC. Thus, few 
applicants are eligible, and so far DOE has closed on a loan only for one 
project—the Vogtle project in Georgia.262 For this plant, at least, the 
specter of unrecoverable cost overruns has been diminished. 
Prospective new entrants today, however, face the same hurdles as 
before. 
2. Competing on the Markets 
The discussion above helps explain why investors are reluctant 
to construct new nuclear plants, but it does not necessarily explain why 
existing plants are finding it so difficult to compete on the wholesale 
markets. Nuclear industry groups typically explain that low natural gas 
prices and policies giving preferences to renewables are to blame.263 But 
what does that really mean? With respect to low natural gas prices, 
recall that low fuel costs for generators translate to low short-run 
marginal costs and low bids into the spot markets.264 This is also true 
for renewables, which have zero fuel costs once installed, and which can 
bid lower prices to the extent they also generate RECs or benefit from 
production tax credits. But there is more to the story for nuclear power, 
as alluded to in Part I. 
 
 259.  Id. § 950.14(a). 
 260.  See Justin Gundlach, Note, What’s the Cost of a Nuclear Power Plant? The Answer’s 
Gonna Cost You: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New Nuclear Plants, 18 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 600, 643–45 (2011). 
 261.  I.R.S. Notice 2006-40, 2006-18 I.R.B. 856 (May 1, 2006). 
 262.  See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATUS OF DOE LOAN PROGRAMS, BRIEFING TO 
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 20 (Feb. 2013). 
 263. Press Release, Nuclear Energy Inst., NEI Warns Wall Street Analysts of Flawed 
Electricity Markets (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.nei.org/News-Media/Media-Room/News-Releases/ 
NEI-Warns-Wall-Street-Analysts-of-Flawed-Electrici [http://perma.cc/H638-CGEE]; Nuclear 
Power in the United States, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Sept. 2015), http://www.world-nuclear.org/ 
info/Country-Profiles/Countries-T-Z/USA--Nuclear-Power/ [http://perma.cc/35K5-YPCR].  
 264.  See supra Section I.C.1. 
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For fossil-fueled power, more fuel must be burned to increase the 
energy output of a plant; thus, those sources’ marginal costs are closely 
tied to the cost of fuel and the efficiency of the plant.265 But nuclear 
power depends on fuel that is loaded every eighteen to twenty-four 
months; this happens on a regularly scheduled basis and corresponds 
with intense, unrelated maintenance activity.266 Small changes in 
output related to grid demand do not change this schedule or the fuel 
costs; with this understanding, we can say that nuclear power’s short-
run marginal costs are zero.267 Moreover, because nuclear plants need 
to run continuously, they bid into the market as “price takers,” meaning 
they will take the spot price, even if that price is negative.268 Recall, 
however, that firms need operating profits to cover their fixed costs. If, 
on average, a firm receives spot prices below its long-run average costs, 
the firm will not be profitable. For nuclear power, those costs include a 
highly trained workforce, backfits, upgrades, insurance payments, fuel 
management, and final waste disposal.269 In other words, the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme, which beneficially internalizes costs 
that for other fuels are externalities, also contributes to higher long-run 
average costs compared to other fuel sources. When spot market prices 
are low, nuclear power can become unprofitable. Indeed, several plants 
have closed for this reason,270 and many others appear to be at risk of 
closure.271 
D. Lessons Learned 
The experience of nuclear power makes several points concrete. 
First, the regulatory contract, once a cornerstone of investor 
 
 265.  See supra Section I.C.1. 
 266.  NUCLEAR ECON. CONSULTING GRP., NUCLEAR POWER & SHORT-RUN MARGINAL COST     2–
3 (2014), http://nuclear-economics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2014-10-01-NECG-
Commentary-2-Nuclear-Power-SRMC.pdf [http://perma.cc/GZY5-GW8W]. 
 267.  Id. In a regulated state, the relevant calculation would include the cost of fuel averaged 
over the expected plant output for the one-and-a-half to two-year operating period. Id. at 2. 
 268.  Id. at 4. 
 269.  See supra Sections II.B–C.  
 270.  See Jennifer Levitz & Rebecca Smith, Vermont Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down as 
Industry Evolves, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/vermont-nuclear-
power-plant-shut-down-as-industry-evolves-1419903597 [http://perma.cc/BSS8-46SA] (citing 
“economic facts, especially related to the natural-gas market,” and collecting examples of other 
shutdowns). 
 271.  See Julie Wernau & Alex Richards, As Exelon Threatens to Shut Nuclear Plants, Illinois 
Town Fears Fallout, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://m.nuclearpowersillinois.com/news-
resources/news-articles/as-exelon-threatens-to-shut-nuclear-plants-illinois-town-fears-fallout 
[http://perma.cc/AU8L-239D] (describing study finding that Exelon’s Illinois reactors have not 
earned enough money to cover operating and ongoing capital expenses). 
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expectations and an assumption underpinning the nuclear regulatory 
regime, no longer offers prospective investors in nuclear power the 
comfort it once did. In restructured states, competition has replaced 
traditional rate regulation; even in traditionally-regulated states, cost 
recovery for large capital projects seems uncertain or open to 
negotiation, rather than a firm expectation. Second, the impact of new 
federal requirements is now felt differently in regulated states—where 
backfitting or licensing costs during construction, for example, are still 
recoverable—as opposed to restructured states—where the same large 
costs cannot be recouped on the market. And finally, in the wholesale 
spot markets where only short-run marginal costs matter, the flaws 
predicted by economists—asset specificity and the missing money 
problem—are manifesting themselves in the reality of nuclear power. 
The markets are blind to the costs nuclear power incurs to provide 
reliable base load and to internalize its environmental impacts. To be 
sure, many would argue that the atomic age should come to a close. But 
the stakes are high: as nuclear power is increasingly priced out of the 
market, scientists have observed corresponding increases in air 
pollution.272 The loss of this low-carbon source of generation is also of 
great concern, as the need for GHG mitigation grows increasingly 
urgent.273 And over time, there is a loss of diversity in fuel sources, 
putting corresponding pressure on reliability of the electric grid. 
We have focused our discussion on nuclear power partly because 
it so clearly demonstrates how and why the markets fail to value 
important attributes for electricity. But these lessons have important 
ramifications for other grid resources. All else equal, price competition 
favors sources like coal that can shift more pollution costs to society, or 
sources like natural gas that do not face the large up-front capital costs 
and long construction times. This puts low-emission sources like 
nuclear and some renewables at a relative disadvantage. Nor are risk 
 
 272.  E.g., ILL. COMMERCE COMM’N ET AL., POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CLOSINGS IN 
ILLINOIS: IMPACTS AND MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS 115 (2015) [hereinafter ILLINOIS REPORT] 
(predicting, in the short-term, increased GHG emissions if nuclear power plants were retired due 
to the need for fossil-fueled base load); Pushker A. Kharecha & James E. Hansen, Prevented 
Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power , 47 ENVTL. 
SCI. & TECH. 4889, 4891–93 (2013) (modeling deaths prevented by use of nuclear power rather 
than coal); Brian Walsh, Japan Mulls Nuclear Revival Not Even 3 Years After Fukushima, TIME 
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://time.com/9684/japan-mulls-nuclear-revival-not-even-3-years-after-
fukushima/ [http://perma.cc/G9FU-YUCT] (describing increased GHG emissions in Japan 
following moratorium on nuclear power). 
 273.  See Suzanne Waldman, Timeline: The IPCC’s Shifting Position on Nuclear Energy, BULL. 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Feb. 8, 2015, 9:48 PM), http://thebulletin.org/timeline-ipcc%E2%80 %99s-
shifting-position-nuclear-energy7975 [http://perma.cc/Q9UN-7XSP] (describing increasing note of 
urgency in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) reports regarding need to use 
all available low-carbon fuels, including nuclear power). 
        
192 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1:141 
perception issues limited to nuclear power. For example, they are 
increasingly a motivating force behind significant opposition to smart 
meters—a key piece of technology that would enable dynamic pricing 
as well as demand response.274 These issues are also contributing to an 
increasing number of bans on hydraulic fracturing, which may impact 
the price of natural gas.275 Overall, there is much work to be done if we 
are to achieve a low-cost, reliable, green grid. 
III. REFORMING THE REGULATORY CONTRACT? 
The story of nuclear power serves as the proverbial canary in the 
coal mine, laying bare the challenges associated with electricity 
markets and regulation as they exist today.276 As the foregoing 
discussion demonstrates, the nuclear licensing regime was created in 
the time of a stronger, simpler regulatory contract, when regulators had 
more control over market entry and pricing, and nuclear plants did not 
compete directly with other generation sources on price. That same 
licensing regime persists now in the context of a system of market 
pricing that takes little notice of the added technical, safety, and 
environmental benefits that the technology provides. As a consequence, 
plants are closing prematurely, and new entrants are few and far 
between. In this Part, we look beyond the nuclear example to the more 
general challenge of balancing cost, reliability/flexibility, and 
environmental attributes in today’s geographically broader, more 
competitive electricity markets. 
The regulatory contract can no longer be conceived of as a set of 
obligations between a single regulator and utility; rather, it is better 
understood as a complex network of relationships, loosely bound by the 
contours of markets as well as the initiatives of multiple layers of 
government and private actors. Electricity markets are not 
unregulated: rather, they are regulated by a pastiche of governmental 
 
 274.  See Joel B. Eisen & Emily Hammond, Risk Perception and the Smart Grid, in 
PROCEEDINGS: SEOUL NAT’L UNIV. INT’L SMART GRID CONF. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file 
with authors) (citing examples; concerns include electromagnetic frequencies, fire hazards, and 
privacy). 
 275.  See David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage v. Cool Analysis, 
25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 155–59 (2013) (exploring behavioral dimensions of opposition to 
hydraulic fracturing).  
 276.  Our focus has been electricity markets, but the experience of natural gas markets also 
demonstrates the point. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954) (holding that the 
Natural Gas Act required FPC to regulate the price of natural gas at the well head into interstate 
commerce); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, 10 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 1995, at 53, 53–55, 84–85 (criticizing Phillips and tracing history of 
natural gas policy). 
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and quasi-governmental institutions whose collective regulatory 
leverage is lessened by the move toward market pricing.  These 
regulatory institutions include FERC and state PUCs, state and federal 
environmental and power plant licensing agencies, and various regional 
governance entities like RTOs/ISOs and power pools.277 Wholesale 
markets dispatch electricity on a least-cost basis, taking account of 
generators’ reliability/flexibility attributes only as necessary to keep 
the grid running and not taking account of generators’ environmental 
attributes at all.278 Instead, the various generation technologies are 
subject to starkly different environmental regulatory regimes, each 
regime affecting the price of electricity differently. 
This Part considers policy options that address these imbalances 
in the system.  Specifically, we explore here the various ways in which 
modern electricity markets can better account for the reliability and 
environmental attributes of different generation technologies at the 
federal, regional, and state level.  We preface that exploration, however, 
with the acknowledgment that federal law is not operating as a unified 
and unifying institution in electricity policy and that fragmented 
jurisdiction, both horizontal and vertical, is likely to be a continuing fact 
of modern electricity markets.279  We assume that the myriad federal 
and state permitting and licensing regimes that impose barriers to 
entry on new power plants will not be consciously rationalized or folded 
into a single one-stop regulatory or licensing regime.  Any such 
rationalization would require congressional action, and Congress is 
currently ill-equipped, or at least disinclined, to address these problems 
legislatively.280 Congress could, for example, amend the Federal Power 
Act to require that “just and reasonable” rates include the cost of 
internalizing externalities and ensuring reliability, or that these 
attributes be explicitly priced in the market.  Alternatively, Congress 
 
 277.  See supra Sections I.A–B. 
 278.  Cf. Del. Dep’t Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(describing potential of backup generators—operated to make up for DR—to harm the 
environment and decrease reliability). 
 279.  These challenges are not new. See, e.g., Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In 
Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1002 (1987) (lamenting irretrievable 
fragmentation of regulatory authority over electricity).  
 280.  Many such statutory solutions have been offered. See generally BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON 
AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY vii (2012), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/3MUR-
8XCK] (listing numerous recommendations, including new statute and new agency for managing 
spent nuclear fuel); Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive 
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014) (proposing amendments to Administrative Procedure Act); 
Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 
(2010) (arguing for a national RPS); SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX: GETTING PAST 
OUR HAND-UPS TO EFFECTIVE CARBON POLICY (2d ed. 2011) (arguing for a carbon tax). 
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could also impose a carbon tax or other environmental tax on 
generation, establish a federal RPS or low-carbon emissions standard, 
or subsidize generation sources with environmental or reliability 
attributes not valued in the market.  In the current climate of 
congressional gridlock, however, these kinds of federal legislative 
modifications to the regulatory contract seem more than unlikely—they 
seem fantastical. 
It follows that jurisdictional conflicts between regulators are 
inevitable. States clash with regional entities, the federal 
government,281 and each other over electricity market regulation. For 
example, states in the western half of the PJM market are in a 
perpetual battle with those in the eastern half over a variety of cost-
allocation issues.282 This is true despite an overarching federal 
structure; FERC itself opened the markets, specified the requirements 
for RTOs and ISOs, and retains oversight authority.283 More and more 
frequently, however, this federal structure is challenged to delineate its 
jurisdictional lines with respect to both electricity markets and 
environmental law.284 
Our updated conception of the regulatory contract requires 
acknowledging these multiple arenas for policy development and 
 
 281.  EPA’s Clean Power Plan has provoked state-federal conflict, including a claim that the 
plan violates states’ Tenth Amendment rights. For a summary of that debate, see Professors 
Freeman and Lazarus Debate Professor Tribe on the Clean Power Plan, HARV. ENVTL. L. PROGRAM: 
EMMETT CLINIC POL. INITIATIVE (March 17, 2015), 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2015/04/01/professors-freeman-and-lazarus-debate-
professor-tribe-on-the-clean-power-plan/ [http://perma.cc/Q9V6-GM97]; and Richard Revesz 
Debates Laurence Tribe Over EPA Proposed Rule During Panel Testimony Before House Committee 
on Energy & Commerce, N.Y.U. L. (March 17, 2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ richard-revesz-
testifies-house-committee-on-energy-and-commerce [http://perma.cc/23AC-QCTL]. 
 282.  See, e.g., Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 756 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing 
competing interests and protracted litigation); see also supra text accompanying note 60 
(describing litigation triggered by the efforts of two eastern PJM states—New Jersey and 
Maryland—to subsidize new generating capacity in their states, and thereby influence prices in 
PJM capacity markets). 
 283.  Freeman & Spence, supra note 22, at 52–55. 
 284.  See supra note 21 (collecting energy examples); see also United Air Regulatory Util. Grp. 
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (upholding in part, and rejecting in part, EPA GHG 
regulations under CAA). Often, these conflicts divide along political party lines. For example, EPA 
is in frequent conflict with states controlled by Republicans during Democratic presidencies, and 
states controlled by Democrats during Republican presidencies. During the George W. Bush 
administration, states sued EPA over a variety of Clean Air Act issues. See generally 
Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (states sought to force EPA to regulate GHG emissions); 
New Jersey v. EPA 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (state challenged EPA’s approach to regulating 
mercury emissions). During the Obama Administration, states sued EPA over another set of Clean 
Air Act issues. See generally EPA v. EME Homer Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (states 
challenged EPA’s approach to regulating pollution transport); White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. 
EPA, 748 F.3d 1222 (2014) (states challenged EPA’s approach to regulating mercury emissions). 
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recognizing that ideological conflicts shape those developments.  
Therefore, we are realistic in limiting our consideration of federal policy 
options to those that federal agencies might adopt, finding room to act 
within their discretionary authority.285 At the same time, federal law 
has left significant gaps for subnational institutional innovators—that 
is, for regional and state governance institutions.286  This observation is 
consistent with recent federalism scholarship287 emphasizing that 
states are more than mere experimenters seeking a common (often 
national) goal in new and different ways.288 Rather, in an increasingly 
ideologically polarized polity, each state is striving to shape the 
regulatory contract in its own way,289 and policy entrepreneurs now look 
to ideologically kindred states as venues within which to pursue their 
policy goals.290 In other words, governance challenges provide 
opportunities for innovation. 
With these considerations in mind, we turn to policy options that 
federal and subnational actors might use to rebalance electricity 
markets that have become skewed by the market failures and the 
uneven application of environmental regulation across generation 
technologies.291 All of these policy options involve changes either to the 
 
 285.  Along with our co-authors, we have made this point before. Freeman & Spence, supra 
note 22, at 80–81; Hammond & Markell, supra note 222, at 316. 
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& Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Rate Design and Policy Innovation in Public Utility 
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 288.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It 
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
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 289.  See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 287, at 1082–83 (emphasizing states as arenas of partisan 
conflict, including conflict with federal actors, while implementing federal regulatory mandates). 
 290.  Id. at 1116–22 (arguing that people identify with parties, and with states based upon the 
dominant party or ideology within the state). 
 291.  In setting forth these options, we have made the deliberate choice of organizing them 
according to the level of government at which they would be implemented. This organizational 
approach is somewhat artificial because some options rely on multi-jurisdictional cooperation, 
while others could be implemented without regard to jurisdiction. But we believe this organization 
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permitting regimes that act as barriers to entry to new generation, or 
to the ways competitive electricity markets value reliability and 
environmental performance. Provided the components of our tripartite 
framework are maximized, we are indifferent to the precise mix of 
electricity resources that would result from these initiatives (or be used 
to achieve improvements). But all change takes place against the status 
quo, so any change will create perceived winners and losers.292 
Consequently—and also because existing source-specific regulation 
sometimes distorts competition in electricity markets—some of the 
initiatives we present here are source-specific. 
A. Federal Initiatives 
Competitive electricity markets struggle to provide an electric 
generation mix that properly values reliability and the externalities of 
production, partly because of the piecemeal and asymmetric way in 
which regulatory regimes address those attributes.293 Nevertheless, 
federal agencies have experienced some success in leveraging their 
already-existing statutory discretion to achieve policy objectives, 
notwithstanding the constant political pressures under which they too 
must operate.294 Here we consider options at three key agencies.  FERC 
oversees wholesale power markets and has some ability to influence the 
ways in which those markets value reliability and environmental 
performance. EPA, FERC, and NRC all act as gatekeepers for new 
 
is preferable to an approach that would use the broad categories of market-based and regulatory 
options for two reasons. First, the distinction is not so neat; market-based approaches require a 
regulatory framework. Second, fundamental to policy comparisons are choices of institutional 
design; we prefer to make the benefits and drawbacks of such choices explicit.  
 292.  EPA’s Clean Power Plan, for example, is meant to apply broadly, but it has generated 
staggering opposition from many different groups that perceive a disadvantage to coal. E.g., 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, In re West 
Virginia, No. 15-1277 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2015) (coal company challenge to EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan); see also NEI, Nuclear Energy Institute Comments on the EPA’s Proposed Rule to Reduce 
Carbon Emissions from Existing Power Plants Under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.nei.org/CorporateSite/media/filefolder/Policy/Environment%20-
%20Water/NEIcommentsEPACleanPowerPlan.pdf?ext=.pdf [http://perma.cc/C8HH-X2HA] 
(commending EPA’s contemplation of nuclear power but criticizing particulars). 
 293.  See generally EISEN ET AL., supra note 44 (describing different federal regulatory regimes 
for hydro, coal, natural gas, nuclear, and renewables). 
 294.  See Hammond, Deference Dilemma, supra note 132, at 1782–85 (describing the political 
climate leading to the Yucca Mountain stall). Admittedly, agencies have many masters. The 
executive, courts, legislative oversight, and stakeholders exert considerable pressure on agencies 
to implement particular policy objectives. But their ability to pursue such objectives 
notwithstanding congressional gridlock means that policy options at the federal agency level 
cannot be ignored.  
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generation through the administration of federal licensing or 
permitting regimes. 
1. FERC Oversight of Wholesale Power Markets 
Because its power over wholesale markets is not plenary under 
the FPA, FERC has addressed the problem of ensuring cleaner, reliable 
power only in careful, measured ways. Some scholars, however, have 
argued that it should take bolder action. For example, Richard Pierce 
has advocated that FERC push more aggressively to complete the 
nationwide transition to RTOs.295 Having merely encouraged this 
transition in Order 889,296 FERC could more fully exercise its authority 
over wholesale sales in interstate commerce to mandate such a 
transition.297 In a market that resembles the competitive ideal—one 
that accurately prices externalities and reliability—such a transition 
could be beneficial. However, many of the dysfunctions we document 
are most acute in the RTO/ISO markets. As we have noted, electricity 
markets do not price externalities and reliability well. If our objective 
were to try to construct the economist’s vision of a rational world built 
on a model of perfect competition, FERC policies pushing ever more 
competitive markets would make sense. In today’s electricity markets, 
however, we believe those changes would not necessarily serve the 
needs of real electric consumers.298 We acknowledge that such changes 
could enhance regional coordination, but they may also come at the cost 
of diminished state flexibility, as we explore in more detail below. 
Others have argued that FERC should impose a carbon adder on 
wholesale sales of electricity.299 The argument is that environmental 
externalities permit emitters of GHGs to charge lower prices than they 
otherwise would, making the markets inconsistent with the just and 
reasonable mandate. This, in turn, would trigger FERC’s remedial 
 
 295.  Richard J. Pierce, Realizing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE 
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power under FPA Section 206 to compel the carbon adders.300 More 
generally, an environmental adder could be imposed on the bid price of 
sellers to better account for the full social costs of that electricity. But 
FERC has been reluctant to directly impose environmental 
considerations on the markets, and there is some question whether the 
scope of its authority extends so far.301 The historical understanding of 
the regulatory contract seems to imply that FERC’s authority to ensure 
rates are “just and reasonable” is limited to serving the economic 
interests of consumers and investors.302 On the other hand, widespread 
market pricing of electricity also represents a stark departure from 
historical practice,303 and the courts have supported the broadening of 
other FPA provisions beyond their narrower, historical understandings 
to include environmental considerations.304  If the regulatory contract 
is better conceived as a legal and institutional arrangement 
contextualized by policy goals, perhaps there is room for argument 
favoring carbon or environmental adders. 
Of course, externalities are not the only attribute of electricity 
that matters. Reliability and flexibility are important both for 
maintaining reasonable rates over time and for the technical operation 
of the grid. Furthermore, FERC’s authority to ensure 
reliability/flexibility is far more settled than its ability to directly 
consider environmental factors. Thus, a reliability and/or flexibility 
adder—this time imposed on the bid costs of buyers—might have better 
 
 300.  Id. at 5.  
 301.  See Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 957–60 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting, 
on zone-of-interest standing grounds, tribe’s argument that FERC should have considered 
environmental impacts as part of just-and-reasonable rate inquiry). FERC itself has taken this 
position. See 18 C.F.R. § 380.4 (2005) (categorical exclusion of rate filings from NEPA). FERC does 
have power to approve rates that take into account state environmental considerations. See Cal. 
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 141 FERC 61,237, at 29 (2012) (permitting tariff revisions to account 
for California’s carbon cap-and-trade program); Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 133 FERC 61,059, at 35 
(2010) (permitting state rates to account for full avoided cost including environmental 
consideration); Jim Rossi & Tim Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 1283, 1310 (2013) (arguing that FERC need not treat PURPA’s avoided cost mandate as 
imposing a ceiling on state incentive rates). 
 302.  See Grand Council of the Crees, 198 F.3d at 956. If FERC were to attempt this, it would 
likely face significant challenges in light of numerous Supreme Court decisions related to agencies’ 
scope of authority. E.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2447 (2014) (holding 
that EPA lacked authority to impose PSD requirements on certain major sources on the sole basis 
of their GHG emissions); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) 
(holding Congress never intended the FDA to regulate tobacco under the then-existing statutory 
scheme).  
 303.  See ISSER, supra note 35, at 27 (describing the origins of FPA). 
 304.  See e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 616, 620 
(2d Cir. 1965) (requiring the Commission to take a broader view of the public interest in licensing 
a hydroelectric project, despite a tradition of focusing on energy and development factors). 
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traction, both as a jurisdictional and political matter.305 As noted in Part 
I, reliability encompasses a suite of attributes (the ability to serve 
several different grid needs), and no single generation source has all of 
those attributes. Therefore, deciding the price of reliability would be a 
complex task.306 But one could conceive of a system that rewards 
different reliability attributes like fuel certainty and rampability. 
Presumably, such an incentive would trigger changes in generation: 
gas-fired plants would be more likely to contract for firm supply, or 
would develop their own, more secure fuel sources; new nuclear 
facilities might be designed to ramp more efficiently, etc. In any case, 
the possibility of directly accounting for this attribute—beyond the 
indirect and incomplete approach of SCED—should be considered given 
its importance to the grid.307 
FERC has not pushed for environmental or reliability adders in 
electricity markets, but in recent years it has adopted narrower rules 
that incentivize a greener grid at the margins, though some of those 
efforts have also bumped up against the potential limits of its 
jurisdiction.  First, FERC adopted Order 719, aimed at facilitating the 
penetration of DR308 in wholesale markets by requiring market 
overseers to accept aggregated DR bids.309 FERC undertook these latter 
two initiatives pursuant to its remedial power under FPA section 206, 
reasoning that the just and reasonable mandate required fairness in 
access to the grid.  In its DR initiative, FERC asserted that DR holds 
the potential to reduce peak demand, thereby reducing market clearing 
prices and minimizing cost.310  It can promote grid reliability by 
providing an additional dispatchable resource during times of peak 
demand or grid constraints.311 And by avoiding electricity generation, 
 
 305.  See John S. Moot, Subsidies, Climate Change, Electric Markets and the FERC, 35 
ENERGY L.J. 345, 372 (2014) (“[A]ny remedies should focus, as much as practicable, on protecting 
the market, not individual competitors.”). 
 306.  Cf. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 237–39 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Edwards, 
J., dissenting) (explaining FERC’s approach to valuing DR). 
 307.  We see no reason why, as a jurisdictional matter, FERC could not approve an RTO/ISO 
tariff that would impose either a carbon or reliability adder. And as described in Section III.3 infra, 
FERC has indeed approved new rules for PJM’s capacity market that take some of these attributes 
into account.  
 308.  DR is demand response, explained supra note 80. 
 309.  Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 
64,101 (Oct. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Order 719]. 
 310.  Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response 
Compensation in Wholesale Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 78–79 (2013). 
 311.  Id.  
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DR can indirectly reduce emissions if the avoided generation is not 
nuclear or a renewable.312 
Next, FERC acted to ease grid access for renewables by 
requiring transmission utilities lower some of the barriers to 
interconnection they had erected.313 Order 1000 aimed to stimulate 
investment in new transmission by mandating that transmission 
utilities engage in regional planning and authorizing rate regimes that 
allow allocation of the costs of new lines more broadly.314  As mentioned 
previously, states within PJM in particular have fought bitterly over 
cost allocation for transmission upgrades, at the expense of the 
reliability and environmental benefits of new transmission.315 Order 
1000 is a response to these and other concerns, and it is expected to 
increase reliability and facilitate integration of renewable generation 
on the grid.316 However, cognizant of the argument that its authority to 
ensure just and reasonable rates may be limited to economic 
considerations, FERC was careful to clarify that its purpose was not to 
favor renewables; it stated “[b]ecause we are not mandating the 
consideration of any particular transmission need driven by a Public 
Policy Requirement, we disagree with [commenters] that we are 
favoring renewable energy resources over other types of resources.”317 
 
 312.  See id. at 79 (arguing that DR has none or few of the negative environmental effects that 
dirty, inefficient plants running at peak times have). But see Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. 
Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing concerns that backup generators 
are replacing DR, diminishing environmental and reliability benefits). Note that FERC’s authority 
to set uniform compensation rules for DR, as well as its method for doing so, are issues that are 
pending before the Supreme Court. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 2049 (May 4, 2015) (No. 14-840) (holding Order 745 invalid as 
beyond FERC’s jurisdiction and concluding pricing rationale was arbitrary and capricious).  
 313.  See, e.g., Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,484–85 (July 
13, 2012) (stating that removing barriers to integration of variable energy resources will encourage 
renewable energy); see also Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Order 1000] 
(mandating transmission planning and standardized cost allocation).  
 314.  See Order 1000, supra note 313, at 49,842–45 (noting the need for consideration of local 
public policy requirements in the transmission planning process). 
 315.  See supra note 282 and accompanying text; see also Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (ICC 
I), 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (requiring allocation of costs of new PJM transmission line 
only to customers who benefit from new lines, and prompting FERC to promulgate Order 1000). 
Compare Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC (ICC II), 756 F.3d 556, 564–65 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting 
PJM’s broad allocation of the costs of the same PJM line addressed in ICC I, after FERC approved 
those costs on remand), with Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 777 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(post-Order 1000 decision authorizing the broad allocation of the cost of a suite of new transmission 
lines planned for the MISO territory). 
 316.  E.g., Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of 
the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 307 (2014) (arguing that Order 1000 could 
streamline coordination by considering regional and local policy goals). 
 317.  Order 1000, supra note 313, at 49,878. 
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In the absence of an explicit broadening of the meaning of “just 
and reasonable” by Congress, FERC seems relegated to measures like 
these. Its use of rulemaking and adjudication to promote investment in 
transmission reliability and a diversity of resources on the grid—
including renewables and DR—can help rebalance competitive 
wholesale electricity markets in ways suggested by our tripartite 
framework.318 As courts review FERC’s actions in this regard, they 
should be careful to avoid reverting to the narrow historical meaning of 
“just and reasonable.” After all, the courts have approved the 
widespread shift from individual rate-setting to market pricing in 
wholesale markets,319 which has ushered in a fundamental 
transformation of the electricity sector—with markets moving toward 
increased reliance on renewable power and DR. 
2. Changes to Federal Licensing and Permitting Regimes 
As described above, existing environmental laws like the Clean 
Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act aim to force thermal (and particularly fossil fueled) power 
plants to internalize externalities, but have done so less thoroughly 
than, say, nuclear licensing.320 However, EPA has undertaken to 
strengthen these regulatory regimes, targeting coal-fired plants in 
particular, with new rules aimed at cross-border pollution, mercury 
emissions, disposal of coal ash, water use, and more.321  Currently, the 
most important EPA initiative is the Clean Power Plan, which 
contemplates that states will replace coal-fired generation with natural 
gas, nuclear, and renewables to reduce GHG emissions.322 States may 
also incorporate non-generation resources into their mix as a means of 
compliance.323  Because it offers states an incentive to replace coal-fired 
power in the dispatch order with low- and zero-emission generation, the 
Clean Power Plan aims directly at the imbalance in competitive 
 
 318.  FERC can also exercise its adjudicatory authority toward these ends; for example, it has 
approved changes to PJM’s capacity market that are also expected to reduce cost, improve 
reliability/flexibility, and diminish environmental externalities. See infra Section III.C. 
 319.  See California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2004); La. Energy 
& Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 365–366 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (approving market-based rates). 
But see Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty., 554 U.S. 
527, 538 (2008) (declining to endorse or reject the conclusion reached in Lockyer and La. Energy). 
 320.  See supra text accompanying notes 151–156 (describing regulation as most common 
approach). 
 321.  See Freeman & Spence, supra note 22, at 28–42 (describing these initiatives); Spence & 
Hammond, supra note 125, at 469–74 (same) 
 322.  CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 11, at 323–24. 
 323.  Id. at 238–39.  
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electricity markets that arises from coal’s externalities. But its impacts 
on reliability are disputed.  Numerous commenters have raised 
concerns about reliability, the costs of compliance, and whether the 
Clean Power Plan will even make an impact in mitigating climate 
change.  Others dispute those claims.324  Whether the Clean Power Plan 
will survive judicial review appears an open question, but it is clear that 
if it is finalized, it will have impacts on each component of our tripartite 
framework. 
In addition to EPA’s regulatory leverage over power plants that 
emit pollutants, there are two federal agencies that exert general 
licensing jurisdiction over power plants.  One, already discussed in 
detail, is NRC. The other is the FERC, which exercises licensing 
authority over hydroelectric projects under the FPA.325 Hydroelectric 
power is renewable and relatively clean, but it engenders 
environmental opposition because of its impacts on recreation, stream 
ecology, and water allocations.326 Moreover, it has been the source of 
considerable friction between states and the federal government.327 
However, as pressure builds to bring more low-emission generation onto 
the grid, FERC could, in connection with its licensing decisions, 
explicitly consider the role that hydroelectric power can play in state 
Clean Power Plan compliance. More generally, FERC could shift its 
policy stance toward projects that would store water in a reservoir 
during periods of low demand, and release the water through the 
turbines during peak demand periods, thereby raising and lowering the 
 
 324.  Numerous entities attempted to model the impacts to the generation mix when EPA first 
proposed its rule in 2014; projections varied considerably. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 14–27 (2015) (providing a summary of the 
results from projects of the new rule), http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ 
powerplants/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM5E-49DK]; Michael Wara et al., 
Peak Electricity and the Clean Power Plan, 28 ELECTRICITY J. 18, 24–25 (2015); see also CLEAN 
POWER PLAN, supra note 11, at 15–17 (presenting modeled projections under final rule). For an 
analysis of the effects of the rule on reliability, and a summary of the various reliability related 
comments on the rule, see Adelman & Spence, supra note 100. 
 325.  See Public Utility Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, § 207, 49 Stat. 803, 842 (Aug. 26, 1935) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2012)) (directing the Federal Power Commission 
(now FERC) to issue hydroelectric licenses on the condition that the applicant’s plan is “best 
adapted to develop, conserve, and utilize in the public interest the water resources of the region”). 
 326.  For extended discussion of the way FERC resolves environmental disputes over 
hydroelectric projects, see J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2265–67 (2005) (finding FERC to be more responsive to environmental 
concerns when raised by a larger number of intervenors); David B. Spence, Managing Delegation 
Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 450–51 (1999) 
(quantitative study concluding that FERC was more responsive to environmental concerns raised 
by environmental agencies, federal or state, than by environmental NGOs). 
 327.  See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994) 
(holding minimum streamflows developed through state certification process were acceptable state 
water quality standards). 
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reservoir frequently.328 Environmental NGOs have opposed storage 
operation because reservoir level fluctuations disrupt the ecology of the 
reservoir and surrounding wetlands.  However, as more intermittent 
wind and solar power comes on line, hydroelectric power could provide 
short-term, backup power (that is, electricity storage) for renewables 
and could do so with fewer emissions than fossil-fueled backup 
generators.  FERC might, therefore, consider adopting a policy that 
provides greater weight to the value of hydroelectric storage as a way 
of displacing more emission-intensive forms of backing up intermittent 
renewable power.329 
Finally, there is also room for improvement in NRC licensing. 
Despite the strongly preemptive and expansive nature of the nuclear 
licensing regime, it leaves considerable room for state innovation on 
second-order matters.330  States have incorporated innovations in rate 
structures, licensing, and construction oversight designed to balance 
the need to provide clean, reliable electricity with the (state) mandate 
of just and reasonable rates.331 This experience suggests the potential 
viability of new federal approaches to nuclear power plant licensing 
that might decrease the nuclear risk premium while still prioritizing 
safety and security. For example, there is currently insufficient 
coordination, and significant duplication, between federal and state 
licensing schemes. States often require status reports and updates, 
including safety information, just as NRC does.332 While these problems 
 
 328.  This kind of storage operation could occur either at pumped storage projects, which pump 
water up to an elevated reservoir during off-peak periods and generate power during peak periods, 
or at conventional hydro stations, by merely letting water build up behind the dam until peak 
demand periods and releasing the water through the turbines only then. FERC has not licensed 
many pumped storage projects since the Scenic Hudson decision, which involved a pumped storage 
project. Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1965). 
And FERC tends to insist that most conventional projects operate in so-called “run of river” mode, 
keeping the reservoir height level by equalizing the flows into the reservoir from upstream with 
the flows released through the turbines. 
 329.  Weissman & Webb, supra note 299, have also argued for expanded FERC policy with 
respect to hydrokinetic projects. Id. at 34–36. 
 330.  See Rossi & Hutton supra note 15, at 1335–36 (arguing states and local authorities have 
been leaders in adopting clean energy solutions). 
 331.  Note that although states may not reject nuclear power plants on safety grounds, they 
do have power, creatively exercised, to make or break nuclear within their borders. Compare Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) 
(holding AEA did not preempt California moratorium on nuclear power; moratorium related to 
economic implications of nuclear waste), with Entergy Nuclear Vt. Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 733 
F.3d 393, 428 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding AEA preempted various portions of Vermont statutes aimed 
at shuttering nuclear power plant). But see generally James W. Moeller, State Regulation of 
Nuclear Power and National Energy Policy, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (1992) 
(arguing for stronger federal preemptive role).  
 332.  See infra Section III.B. 
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could be mitigated by a regulatory scheme of shared authority333 or a 
regime modeled on the French approach (federally-sponsored projects 
that would be turned over to private operators),334 both options would 
require legislative intervention and are unlikely to come to fruition. 
Nonetheless, overhauling the federal regulatory scheme is an important 
option—and not necessarily one dependent on congressional action. In 
addition to the major 1980s changes to its licensing regime, NRC could 
take additional actions to try to reduce the nuclear risk premium.335  
The experience gained under the current regulations should be put to 
work in updating those regulations as necessary.336 
Inefficient regulation imposes costs, and prospective new 
entrants are particularly disadvantaged with regard to licensing new 
plants and innovative reactor designs. In particular, others have noted 
the need for a different kind of licensing scheme for new nuclear 
technologies like small modular reactors (SMRs), which cannot hope for 
economic viability if they must proceed under the traditional licensing 
scheme.337 NRC itself is studying the problem and should make such 
changes a priority.338 Relevant to both attracting new entrants and 
retaining the existing nuclear fleet, NRC’s Near-Term Task Force, 
which reported on lessons learned from Fukushima, has also 
recommended revamping NRC’s safety regulations to better marry the 
 
 333.  See Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,612, 
60,613 (Oct. 14, 2008) (rejecting, on statutory mandate grounds, commenter suggestion for pilot 
licensing scheme whereby private bureaus would review SMR applications). 
 334.  For an overview of the French system, see WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, NUCLEAR POWER IN 
FRANCE, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/France/ (last updated 
Sept. 2015) [http:// perma.cc/VM4D-DM7G]. 
 335.  E.g., Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 343–45 (1st Cir. 
2004) (describing shift from part 50 to part 52 licensing scheme). 
 336.  Moreover, more research is needed to align the insights of behavioral psychology to 
effective regulatory approaches designed to enhance the efficiency of regulation. Cf. SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 190, at 69 (suggesting research shows improper risk perception leads to inefficient 
regulatory behavior). 
 337.  See Peter Taberner, Licensing process to catapult US-SMR export potential, NUCLEAR 
ENERGY INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2015), http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/small-modular-
reactors/licensing-process-catapult-us-smr-export-potential [http://perma.cc/XAG9-SUQ5] (noting 
need for licensing process evolution). A significant issue for new U.S. nuclear energy is the 
availability of foreign markets, which is contingent on the law of export controls set forth in § 123 
of the Atomic Energy Act. See Press Release, President Barack Obama, Message to Congress—
Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Apr. 21, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/21/message-congress-agreement-
cooperation-between-government-united-states- [https://perma.cc/G3EQ-2MYN] (emphasizing the 
importance of an American-Chinese relationship in trade and nuclear nonproliferation).  
 338.  See Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors, 73 Fed. Reg. at 60,613 
(describing initial efforts to address safety and licensing issues related to advanced reactors like 
SMRs); see also BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, supra note 280, at vii (listing recommendations). 
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defense-in-depth concept to probabilistic risk assessment.339 And while 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act has stalled perhaps past the point of any 
return, numerous recommendations for a new approach are on the 
table,340 including an NRC rule issued in 2014.341 
Overall, any of these initiatives would be aimed at reducing the 
cost of nuclear power. If it were more economical to construct, operate, 
and manage the back end of the fuel cycle, then presumably existing 
plants would be encouraged to continue operating and renew their 
licenses, promoting the reliability of the system both technically and 
with respect to preserving a diverse mix of fuel sources. Because nuclear 
power’s emissions profile is so beneficial, the environmental advantages 
of nuclear power would also be retained. And perhaps investors would 
be more willing to consider new nuclear power and nuclear innovation 
to further reap these benefits. To be sure, the changes we mention 
would prompt significant backlash from groups opposed to nuclear 
power. The courts’ response to such initiatives, moreover, may be 
difficult to predict.342 Proposals like these seem likely to draw the 
attention of Congress and the President, though their reactions might 
depend on which party is in control of those institutions when proposals 
like these are floated, if they ever are. The inevitability of such hurdles, 
however, is a feature of the landscape for any major regulatory 
initiative influencing energy markets. Public choice theory, after all, 
also predicts that NRC might have an interest in reducing the nuclear 
risk premium; the agency stands to lose importance over time if the 
number of nuclear reactors dwindles.343 
 
 339.  See NTTF Report, supra note 198, at 15–23 (providing background information and 
recommendations for balancing defense-in-depth and risk considerations). 
 340.  A number of such recommendations, issued by the Blue Ribbon Commission, would 
require statutory amendments. See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, supra note 280, at viii (cataloguing 
needs for statutory change). 
 341.  See Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 79 Fed. Reg. 56,238, 56,240 (Sept. 19, 
2014) (finding reasonable assurances of safety of long-term spent fuel storage); see also Petition 
for Review, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, No. 14-1217 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 29, 
2014) (challenging rule). 
 342.  See Hammond, Dialogue, supra note 168, at 1733 (describing the spectrum of judicial 
deference). 
 343.  But see Allison M. Macfarlane, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Remarks to the 
National Press Club (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/ 
speeches/2014/s-14-012.pdf [http://perma.cc/VQ4R-Q3XS] (“I believe it’s time for the NRC to 
develop regulations specific to the decommissioning of nuclear power plants, both to help utilities 
through decommissioning and to structure public expectations of the process.”). 
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B. State Initiatives 
As noted in Part I, many states use RPSs to directly promote a 
greener generation mix, and RPSs have grown steadily in number and 
strength since the early 1980s; today two-thirds of the states have in 
place some form of RPS.344 RPSs vary considerably in their design, but 
they typically specify some percentage of electricity sales within a state 
that must or should be attributable to renewable fuel sources.345 In 
competitive markets, RPSs increase the price electricity retailers are 
willing to pay for clean power; in those states, ratepayers may pay more 
for power as a consequence. Developments in federal law, including the 
Clean Power Plan and a growing appreciation for other low-carbon 
resources like nuclear power, have pushed some states to revise their 
RPSs to emphasize carbon neutrality rather than renewable fuels per 
se. Ohio, for example, has a low-carbon standard, which requires that 
by 2025, half the mandated 25% carbon emissions reduction must come 
from renewables, while the other half must come from sources like 
third-generation nuclear power, energy efficiency, and clean coal 
technology.346 These kinds of clean energy standards can be a powerful 
tool for greening the energy mix, but states have other tools as well. 
States have considerable say in the types of electricity 
generation constructed within their borders.  Some impose their own 
licensing regimes on new plant construction.347 Some employ integrated 
resource planning (“IRP”), a way of evaluating and comparing proposed 
new generation.348 IRP is conducted in some form in at least twenty-
seven states.349 State IRP processes only sometimes attempt to 
incorporate projected environmental impacts into electric generating 
capacity planning decisions but they could do so. Those that do pursue 
this objective do so by forcing utilities to consider demand-side 
resources (energy efficiency and conservation) in making decisions 
 
 344.  For an up-to-date list, see DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY, www.dsireusa.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2015) [http://perma.cc/54W6-PDTX]. 
 345.  See id. (describing programs in different states).  
 346.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64 (West 2012); cf. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 
3d 891, 907 (D. Minn. 2014) (striking down portions of Minnesota low-carbon standard on dormant 
Commerce Clause grounds).    
 347.  See EISEN ET AL., supra note 44, at 78–79 (outlining several steps in the state licensing 
process). 
 348.  See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 111, 106 Stat. 2776, 2795 (codified 
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(7) (2012)) (directing utilities to implement ISP).  
 349.  Rachel Wilson & Paul Peterson, A Brief Survey of State Integrated Resource Planning 
Rules and Requirements, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECON. 11 (April 28, 2011), http://www.cleanskies.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ACSF_IRP-Survey_Final_2011-04-28.pdf [http://perma.cc/TC7N-
CGPN].  
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about how best to meet projected future electric energy needs, or by 
requiring planners to consider the environmental costs new generating 
plants will produce.350 A minority of states also articulate a goal of 
maintaining fuel diversity in capacity planning decisions, which could 
be a way of promoting long-term reliability in state licensing or IRP 
processes.351 In addition to trying to value fuel diversity, several states 
employ adders to the estimated costs of power for new plants 
representing the cost of externalities generated by those plants over 
their lifetimes.352 States’ methodologies for valuing externalities vary 
considerably.353 The key point, however, is that states can incorporate 
externalities into decisions about which plants to build, even if 
electricity markets do not incorporate these considerations directly into 
decisions about which plants to dispatch to serve load. Doing so would 
help rebalance markets consistent with our tripartite framework. 
Note that incorporating externalities and reliability into 
capacity planning is most easily achieved where traditional rate 
regulation and vertically integrated utilities continue to predominate 
(mainly the southeastern United States). In those states, utilities can 
satisfy reliability and clean energy goals with far less risk of revenue 
losses; the tradeoff is that ratepayers may pay more for power in those 
states.354 For example, states can permit utilities to recover the carrying 
costs of construction from ratepayers for capital-intensive projections. 
The Georgia Nuclear Financing Act, enacted just after Southern 
 
 350.  For a helpful description of how Arizona, Colorado, and Oregon use integrated resource 
planning, see Rachel Wilson & Bruce Biewald, Best Practices in Electric Utility Integrated Resource 
Planning, REG. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, 6–16 (June 2013), http://www.raponline.org/ 
document/download/id/6608 [http://perma.cc/SX9Q-J7AH]. 
 351.  See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 352.  See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 22, at 1695–96 (collecting examples); Wilson & Biewald, supra 
note 349, at 16–25 (same). 
 353.  For one example, see MINN. STAT. § 216B.243(3)(a) (1994). The statute requires the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to “quantify and establish a range of environmental costs 
associated with each method of electricity generation.” Id. § 216B.2422(3)(a); see also In re 
Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding PUC 
regulations); In re Quantification of Environmental Costs, 150 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 130, 137 
(1994) (explaining how environmental externalities are quantified in Minnesota); Jonas J. Monast 
& Sarah K, Adair, The Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility Regulation: Aligning State-Level 
Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 40–41 (2013) 
(collecting further examples of state PUCs considering environmental factors in exercise of general 
authority). Valuation is a complex process, but resources are available. See generally NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY: UNPRICED CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY 
PRODUCTION AND USE (2009); Nicholas Muller & Robert Mendelson, Efficient Pollution Regulation: 
Getting the Prices Right, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1714 (2009); Ian F. Roth and Lawrence L. Ambs, 
Incorporating Exernalities into a Full Cost Approach to Electric Power Generation Life-Cycle 
Costing, 29 ENERGY 2125 (2004). 
 354.  There is considerable debate whether this is true. See infra text accompanying notes 
355–58.   
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Company sought authorization from Georgia’s PUC to construct the 
Vogtle units, permits Southern Company to collect from ratepayers the 
financing costs of Vogtle during its construction.355 A South Carolina 
statute, by contrast, permits recovery of carrying costs for utilities 
seeking to construct base load plants, which are defined as new coal or 
nuclear generation with a generating capacity of 350 megawatts or 
greater.356 As yet another example, Florida’s PUC has issued a rule 
permitting recovery of carrying costs for new nuclear construction.357 
These initiatives are not without controversy; sustained opposition 
illustrates that even with state support, efforts to encourage particular 
fuels may be hindered.358 
Nevertheless, the ability to recover costs through ratemaking 
may well explain why new nuclear reactor construction is currently 
taking place only in traditionally regulated states. Certainly the ability 
to guarantee rate recovery for construction carrying costs, as 
exemplified by Georgia’s example, is far clearer in states that use 
traditional notions of the state regulatory contract, including cost 
recovery. Note, however, that this traditional approach to incentivizing 
investment is not unique to nuclear power, or to traditionally regulated 
state markets. Remember that even in competitive markets, the rates 
of transmission and distribution (“wires”) companies remain regulated. 
So wires companies can recover their investments in smart meters and 
grid storage, for example, which are also aimed at enhancing grid 
reliability.359 
 
 355.  By its terms, the Act’s most specific provisions applied only to nuclear plants certified by 
the state PUC between January 1, 2009 and July 1, 2009, making Southern the only eligible 
company. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 46-2-25(c)(3) (2009); Fulton Cty. Taxpayers Found. v. Ga. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, 700 S.E.2d 554, 557–58 (Ga. 2010) (holding plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
PUC certification and statute). Note that NRC’s COL licenses were issued February 10, 2012. 
Contingent on cost recovery is Southern’s duty to make frequent reports to the PUC. This reporting 
process has revealed that the current construction is over budget and behind schedule. See also 
Thomas Overton, Even More Delays and Cost Overruns for Vogtle Expansion, POWER (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.powermag.com/even-more-delays-and-cost-overruns-for-vogtle-expansion/ 
[http://perma.cc/B42F-DZEW] (detailing new reports of cost overruns and delays, as well as 
construction litigation). 
 356.  Base Load Review Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-220(2) (2011). In the case of coal, the 
statute specifies that such plants are required to comply with Best Available Control Technology 
for air emissions, as defined by EPA. Id.  
 357.  See FLA. ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 25-6.0423(6) (2007) (permitting a utility to petition the 
Florida Public Service Commission to recover carrying costs).  
 358.  See Fulton Cnty., 700 S.E.2d at 555 (upholding judgment in favor of the Georgia PSC 
arising out of Vogtle certification). 
 359.  Recovery remains subject to PUCs’ decision making and state law. See Eisen, supra note 
15, at 17–20; see also Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility 
Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371, 372–
73, 377 (2014) (noting challenges and solutions). 
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Conversely, recent experience suggests that restructured states 
whose generators participate in competitive wholesale markets cede 
some control over the generation mix in their states. Consider the 
following. In the early 2000s, two states in the eastern portion of PJM, 
New Jersey and Maryland, grew dissatisfied with wholesale electricity 
prices in eastern PJM. Policymakers in both states concluded that the 
PJM capacity market was not inducing sufficient investment in new 
generation facilities in eastern PJM and undertook to subsidize 
construction of new natural-gas fired generation within their state 
borders. Reasoning that these subsidies would distort prices in the PJM 
market, two different federal circuit courts, in 2014, overturned each of 
these two subsidy programs as preempted by the FPA, which grants the 
FERC exclusive authority to regulate wholesale rates.360 A key part of 
both courts’ rationale was that by restructuring, the states had thrown 
“[their] lot with the federal interstate markets” and relinquished their 
former regulatory autonomy.361 Thus, even though the states still 
retained authority over siting and construction, by giving up their 
authority to set electricity rates under the traditional approach, they 
had also limited their ability to compensate for distortions that 
generators within their borders might encounter.362 
Restructured states within competitive wholesale markets have 
looked at other ways to make up for perceived deficiencies, however. A 
study by the New York Independent System Operator (“NYISO”), for 
example, concluded that if the aging R.E. Ginna nuclear power plant in 
New York were to retire, its loss would result in numerous bulk-
transmission system and non-bulk local distribution system reliability 
violations.363 As a result, New York’s Public Service Commission 
approved Exelon’s request to seek a reliability support services 
agreement with a transmission owner in order to keep the plant 
 
 360.  PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 255 (3d Cir. 2014), pet’ns for cert. filed 
sub noms. CPV Power Dev., Inc. v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 2014 WL 6737445 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2014) 
(No. 14-634) and Fiordaliso v. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, 2014 WL 6998396 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2014) (No. 
14-694) (holding New Jersey effort to compensate new generation for capacity market disparities 
was preempted by Federal Power Act); PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 476–77 
(4th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. Hughes v. PPL EnergyPlus LLC, 2015 WL 6112868 (Oct. 
19, 2015) (holding that a similar Maryland scheme is preempted by the Federal Power Act but 
noting limits on federal authority). 
 361.  Nazarian, 745 F.3d at 473; see also Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248 (“New Jersey divorced the 
entities that generate electricity from those that supply it.”). 
 362.  E.g., Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248. But see ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 
(2015) (holding Natural Gas Act did not preempt state-law antitrust claims against natural gas 
traders operating on both the wholesale and retail markets).  
 363.  NEW YORK INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, ADDITIONAL RELIABILITY STUDY FOR EXELON 
CORPORATION: EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF THE RETIREMENT OF THE GINNA NUCLEAR 
GENERATION STATION ON THE NEW YORK STATE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 17 (2014). 
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operating despite its loss of a long-term power contract and inability to 
operate in the low-priced power market.364 According to some estimates, 
the new power contract would charge over eighty percent more than 
wholesale rates.365 But the Commission reasoned that the power 
source’s reliability and carbon-free capability made it a key asset in the 
state’s generation fleet.366 
Other state activities in RTO/ISO regions echo the notion that 
reliability as an attribute is undervalued. Ohio’s PUC, for example, is 
considering whether to permit a rate rider in its retail rates to make up 
for low wholesale rates in order to retain existing nuclear capacity.367 
Consider also the Illinois House of Representatives’ recent resolution 
calling on various state agencies to prepare reports “showing how the 
premature closure of existing nuclear power plants in Illinois will 
affect” reliability and capacity for the Midwest region, increased GHG 
emissions, and the state’s economy.368 The resolution instructed 
agencies to include findings about potential market-based solutions to 
avoid premature closings of the state’s nuclear power plants. Among the 
resolution’s findings were the importance of nuclear power to meeting 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan proposal, ensuring reliability and capacity, 
and preserving numerous nuclear-power related jobs in the state.369 The 
report, issued January 25, 2015, considered several market-based 
solutions: relying purely on the existing market, a cap-and-trade 
program, a carbon tax, a low-carbon portfolio standard, and a 
sustainable power planning standard.370 For all of the options, however, 
it recommended further research, cautioning that any approach 
directed at nuclear power plants “should be mindful of the looming 
 
 364.  Barry Cassell, Exelon, Rochester Still Working on Life-Saving Deal for Ginna Nuclear 
Plant, GENERATION HUB (Feb. 6, 2015), http://generationhub.com/2015/02/06/exelon-rochester-
still-working-on-life-saving-deal [http://perma.cc/JHS2-XF25]. 
 365.  Naureen S. Malik & Jim Polson, New York Reactor’s Survival Tests Pricey Nuclear, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-05/new-york-reactor-s-
survival-tests-pricey-nuclear.html [http://perma.cc/2L4V-KVXP]. 
 366.  Id.; see also NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE R.E. GINNA NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANT 2 (Feb. 2015) (concluding plant is “significant economic contributor to the region 
and New York”). 
 367.  But see Solomon, 766 F.3d at 248–49, 255 (holding New Jersey’s Long Term Capacity 
Pilot Program Act preempted by Federal Power Act because it regulated wholesale capacity prices; 
statute was aimed at encouraging construction of new, efficient power generating plants); 
Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 476–77 (similar).  
 368.  H.R. 1146, 98th Gen. Assemb., at 8 (Ill. 2014). 
 369.  Id. at 1–4. In addition, the resolution also called on FERC and RTOs to adopt rules and 
policies to help ensure the continued operation of nuclear power plants. Id. at 6. 
 370.  ILL. COMMERCE COMM’N ET AL., POTENTIAL NUCLEAR PLANT CLOSINGS IN ILLINOIS, 
OVERVIEW 1 (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.icc.illinois.gov/electricity/workshops/hr1146.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/A4W8-6YSZ].  
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Clean Power Plan compliance requirements.”371 So far, the low-carbon 
portfolio standard appears to have the most traction.372 
C. Regional Initiatives 
Regional entities, mainly RTOs/ISOs, administer some of the 
FERC policies aimed at greening the generation mix described in 
Section III.A. They also operate wholesale markets in ways that 
accommodate state initiatives, like RPSs, and can accommodate multi-
state green initiatives. For example, the northeastern ISOs operate 
within the boundaries of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(“RGGI”), a voluntary carbon trading regime created by a group of 
northeastern states.373 The carbon trading regime influences the bid 
prices of generators into wholesale markets by requiring them to 
purchase pollution rights in amounts that cover their actual emissions. 
There are few other examples,374 suggesting the potential to do more 
but also reinforcing the governance issues described above. Notably, the 
Clean Power Plan envisions state cooperation to achieve GHG emission-
reduction goals, suggesting federal support of region-driven 
approaches. 
Reliability, by contrast, has generally been the concern of 
multiple layers of governmental and private sector actors, including 
FERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(“NERC”),375 regional reliability entities overseen by NERC,376 
RTOs/ISOs, and states. Every NERC region has an established reserve 
margin target, or desired amount of available generation over and 
 
 371.  ILLINOIS REPORT, supra note 272, at 158–59.  
 372.  See Steve Daniels, Exelon Proposes Surcharge on Power Bills; Legislation Expected Soon, 
CRAIN’S (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20150224/NEWS11/ 
150229921/exelon-proposes-surcharge-on-power-bills-legislation-expected-soon [http://perma.cc/ 
9WGE-7TXR] (discussing the newly formed coalition of supporters behind such a “low-carbon 
portfolio” in Illinois).  
 373.  REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, www.rggi.org [http://perma.cc/ATS5-QGFK] 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 374.  Cf. Frederic Tomesco & Lynn Doan, California, Quebec Seek Partners to Grow Carbon 
Market, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-24/ 
quebec-california-seeking-to-boost-size-of-carbon-market [http://perma.cc/JJU2-F7LB] (describing 
the California-Quebec market). 
 375.  Section 215 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 directed FERC to appoint and oversee a 
national electric reliability organization. 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2012). FERC appointed NERC to this 
role in 2006. Order Certifying North American Electric Reliability Corporation as the Electric 
Reliability Organization and Ordering Compliance Filing, 116 FERC ¶ 61,062, at 4 (2006). 
 376.  The boundaries of these regional entities correspond roughly to the boundaries of 
RTOs/ISOs in organized power markets. See Regional Entities, NERC, http://www.nerc.com/ 
AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/Regional-Entities.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/W86V-3AJE] (showing boundaries of the eight regional entities under NERC). 
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above anticipated peak demand. In NERC regions dominated by 
traditionally regulated, vertically integrated electric utilities, meeting 
the reserve margin target is a simple matter because utilities have an 
incentive to invest in generation.377 In areas with wholesale markets 
overseen by RSOs/ISOs, capacity markets, mentioned in Part I, 
represent another way to try to meet reserve margin targets. 
To date, capacity markets have not attempted to place a value 
on fuel diversity or social costs.378 Indeed, it is the failure of competitive 
wholesale markets to reward the combination of reliability and low 
emissions that has led states like Illinois, New York, and Ohio to 
consider incentives to keep plants open, as described in the previous 
section. Capacity markets could explicitly incorporate fuel diversity into 
their selection criteria to avoid these problems. On the other hand, 
regional capacity planning presents collective action problems, which 
in turn can present federalism problems, as the above examples of New 
Jersey and Maryland reveal. Given the conflicts between states in the 
eastern and western portions of PJM,379 it is not difficult to imagine 
that disputes will erupt within regional entities over attempts to value 
fuel diversity or social costs in capacity markets. 
Nevertheless, FERC recently approved PJM’s request to change 
its capacity market rules, beginning with the August 2015 capacity 
auctions.  As modified on rehearing, the new rules enable non-
generation resources to participate, discount fuel sources like wind and 
solar that are not dispatchable, and penalize resources that are not 
available if called upon.380 Further, the new rules permit natural gas 
bidders to exceed the default offer gap if the exceedance is due to the 
extra costs of having contracted for firm supply.381 It remains to be seen 
how the new rules will function, but it is notable that these rules single 
out specific generation source attributes in ways that favor reliability 
and diversity of fuel mix; if more resources are available at times of 
peak demand, the overall market clearing prices should be lower. 
 
 377.  This effect is attributed to the cost-of-service approach to ratemaking. See supra note 
163.  
 378.  See Exelon on the 2014 PJM Capacity Market Auction, NEI (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/News-Archives/Exelon-on-the-2014-PJM-Capacity-Market-
Auction [http://perma.cc/87KN-ED8R] (criticizing PJM capacity planning process because it 
“reveal[s] that the market does not sufficiently recognize the significant value that nuclear plants 
provide in terms of reliability and environmental benefits”). 
 379.  Supra text accompanying notes 282–84. 
 380.  Order Denying Request for Clarification, Granting in Part Request for Rehearing, 152 
FERC ¶ 61,064, at 3–4 (July 22, 2015); Order on Proposed Tariff Revisions, 151 FERC ¶ 61,208, 
at 4 (June 9, 2015). 
 381.  151 FERC ¶ 61,208, at 9–10. 
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The Texas grid operator has eschewed capacity markets in favor 
of letting wholesale prices rise to a cap of $9,000/MWh382 (as compared 
with average prices of less than $50/MWh)383 as a way of rewarding 
investment in new capacity. However, concerned that high prices alone 
might not be a sufficient incentive, Texas regulators have explored 
intervening in ancillary services markets to increase payments to 
providers of ancillary services (essentially, a reliability adder), which 
are very short-term reserves.384 Traditionally, the grid operator 
dispatches reserves the same way it dispatches other generation 
resources, using the SCED rule. This idea would act as a kind of 
reliability adder in the ancillary services market. 
In any of the wholesale markets, one could conceivably interject 
social costs into the dispatch system as well, through the use of adders 
in the dispatch process. The idea behind social cost dispatch is to modify 
current SCED rules by adding to each source’s bid cost an estimate of 
that facility’s marginal social costs (that is, estimated marginal value 
of its external costs). This is conceptually straightforward, but 
controversial and extremely complex in practice. In theory, such adders 
would be equivalent to the imposition of an optimal emissions tax,385 
imposed only on electric generators. The adder would, like the tax, force 
firms to internalize an optimal amount of external costs. Some scholars 
have proposed methods of full social cost (or “environmental/economic”) 
 
 382.  See POTOMAC ECONOMICS, LTD., 2014 STATE OF THE MARKET REPORT FOR THE ERCOT 
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS xxv (July 2015) (market monitor’s report presenting real-time 
electricity prices for 2014). 
 383.  Id. at i. 
 384.  See PUB. UTIL. COMM’N OF TEX., PROJECT 40000: COMMISSION PROCEEDING TO ENSURE 
RESOURCE ADEQUACY IN TEXAS, http://www.puc.texas.gov/industry/projects/electric/40000/ 
40000.aspx [http://perma.cc/W5XZ-QRGT] (providing information and documents). 
 385.  Theoretically, the tax should be set at a price that will induce generators to reduce 
pollution to the point at which the marginal benefit of the next unit of pollution equals its marginal 
cost. THOMAS TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 52–54 (1992). 
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dispatch,386 but others believe it is unworkable.387 EPA’s proposed Clean 
Power Plan aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the 
electricity sector by encouraging (but not requiring) states to dispatch 
cleaner sources of power—nuclear, natural gas, and renewables in place 
of coal,388 thereby introducing environmental considerations into 
dispatch decisions directly.389 But that plan has met with hostility from 
Republican appointees to FERC, precisely because it would represent a 
step toward an “environmental dispatch” model.390  Thus, even if such 
costs could be calculated appropriately, the political viability of such an 
approach is questionable. 
CONCLUSION 
We have explored some of the ways in which the move toward 
less regulated, more competitive markets has shifted the way we 
balance cost, reliability/flexibility, and environmental externalities in 
the electric generation mix. If the foregoing discussion makes daunting 
the prospect of fully realizing the vision of an efficient, reliable, and 
 
 386.  See, e.g., Stephen Bernow et al., Full-Cost Dispatch: Incorporating Environmental 
Externalities in Electric System Operation, 4 ELEC. J. 20, 26–29 (1991) (advocating full social cost 
dispatch, while acknowledging difficult implementation problems). A number of engineers have 
proposed algorithms for accomplishing full social cost dispatch. See, e.g., M.A. Abido, 
Environmental Economic Power Dispatch Using Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms , 18 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSS. 1529, 1530–32 (2003); Simona Dinu et al., Environmental 
Economic Dispatch Optimization Using a Modified Genetic Algorithm, 20 INT’L. J. COMPUTER APP. 
975, 976–79 (2011); Terje Gjengedal et al., Environmental Objectives in Power Production Unit 
Commitment and Dispatch, ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS, at 9.59 
(Aug.–Sept. 1992), http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/1992/data/papers/SS92_ Panel9_Paper08.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Z2YH-4T66]; Mimoun Younes et al., Environmental/ Economic Power Dispatch 
Problem, PROCEEDINGS: 2013 CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY ECOSYSTEMS, AND 
DEVELOPMENT, 170, 170–73, http://www.europment.org/library/2013/venice/ 
bypaper/EEEAD/EEEAD-24.pdf [http://perma.cc/ VMC5-CQ8A]. 
 387.  Perhaps the most prominent scholar opposing full social cost dispatch is William Hogan. 
See generally William W. Hogan, Electricity Market Design: Environmental Dispatch, JFK SCH. OF 
GOV’T, HARV. UNIV. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/ 
2014/12.14/Hogan%20Presentation.pdf [http://perma.cc/5X5V-UKSG].  
 388.  CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 11, at 34,856. The Plan would establish emissions 
budgets for each state based, in part, on assumptions about how much each state can dispatch 
cleaner technologies in place of coal-fired power. 
 389.  This has provoked complaints from opponents of the proposed plan who argue that a 
system of “environmental dispatch” violates the just and reasonable rate requirement. See 
generally Hogan, supra note 387.  
 390.  See FERC Perspective: Questions Concerning EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan and 
other Grid Reliability Challenges: H.R. Hearing Before the Comm. On Energy & Commerce, 
Subcomm. on Energy & Power, 113th Cong. 7–9 (July 29, 2014) (written testimony of FERC 
Commissioner Philip D. Moeller), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20140729091755-Moeller-07-
29-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/M6CE-H9R4] (also arguing that environmental dispatch is 
unworkable). 
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green grid, it also suggests reasons for optimism.391  There are many 
institutional actors at every governance level who are trying to realize 
this vision, and there is room for much more experimentation. This 
observation, however, returns us to our starting point: what do all of 
these developments mean for the regulatory contract? Once defined by 
two parties and a nineteenth-century purpose, the regulatory contract 
is now characterized by heterogeneity and complexity among regulated 
entities and regulators alike. 
But more work is needed to fully align this concept with the 
clean, reliable, and cost-efficient grid. As we have shown, a number of 
mismatches between old regulatory regimes and competitive markets 
have resulted in a failure to value some attributes of electricity. The 
least-cost imperative helps sources whose long-run average costs fall 
below the projected long-run marginal costs at which competitive 
markets price wholesale power. The need to compete in those markets 
discourages polluting sources like coal-fired power plants from 
internalizing those externalities, or natural gas-fired plants from 
paying more for a firm fuel supply. However, the experience of nuclear 
power demonstrates these mismatches most starkly. Prospective new 
entrants are disincentivized to construct high-capital projects with an 
added risk premium; current players are being priced out of the 
markets, notwithstanding their reliable, clean contribution to the grid. 
We have considered a number of policy options that would 
attempt to better maximize our tripartite framework. This context 
points to the need for further research that considers various policy 
options in tandem, rather than in isolation. If the regulatory contract is 
a network, its component parts must be examined with this in mind.392 
More generally, our analysis illustrates that the legal framework within 
which the markets operate shapes those markets. In other words, 
institutions matter. In electricity markets, those institutions have 
changed dramatically over the last three decades. The move from 
comprehensive regulation and administrative price-setting to 
competition and market prices has not provided us with an electric 
generation mix that satisfies all of the important attributes we seek. 
 
 391.  We are not alone in this optimism. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 287 (framing the 
variety in state and regional electricity markets as part of the process of experimentation that will 
move us eventually toward a carbon-free grid). 
 392.  Of course, any policy prescription must recognize that the hodgepodge of existing federal, 
regional and state initiatives we have described are not the product of any consensus agreement 
about the proper balance between cost, reliability, and environmental impact in the electric 
generation mix. Rather, they are the product of partisan and interest group conflict, and 
competition (more than cooperation) between those pursuing a vision of more competitive markets 
and those pursuing a vision of cleaner energy markets. 
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Thus, competition may bring certain types of efficiency, but it does not 
obviate the need for regulation. To the contrary, modern electricity 
markets under supply clean, reliable sources of electricity generation 
by focusing on minimizing costs. If we are to truly pursue a low-cost, 
reliable, and green grid, we must view the regulatory contract as a 
flexible mechanism—one that can incorporate a variety of policy 
options, at multiple governance levels, to change the inputs to the 
markets or even alter the markets themselves. 
 
